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The twentieth century suffered from deep ideological conflict linked to the epoch of total 
war and the divided character of the international political economy, punctuated by a 
struggle between Eastern and Western ideas, communism versus liberal democracy. To 
the surprise of many, this struggle culminated with the complete collapse of communism 
in Eastern Europe in 1989, symbolized by the tearing down of the Berlin Wall between 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) and Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG or West Germany). However, the end of the Cold War shed little light on 
how the so-called second world held itself together for nearly a half-century. 
This thesis examines the forces and logic that sustained East Germany as a 
sovereign state in the Soviet bloc from 1945–1949 to 1989. The research is framed partly 
as a historical narrative of the GDR and partly as a historical analysis of the state’s 
collapse. This thesis proves how the party, secret police, army, and church permitted East 
Germans to exercise citizenship within the constructed mass organizations of the GDR, 
and how the interplay between the party and social institutions in East Germany first 
sustained, then subverted the totalitarian order. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The twentieth century suffered from deep ideological conflict linked to the epoch 
of total war and the divided character of the international political economy. This process 
resulted in two ideological poles that dominated, especially Europe, for nearly 50 years 
following the end of the Second World War, punctuated by a struggle between Eastern 
and Western ideas, communism versus liberal democracy. To the surprise of many in the 
East and West, this struggle culminated with the complete collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe, symbolized by the tearing down of the Berlin Wall between the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG 
or West Germany) in November of 1989.  
Scholars, historians, and experts of, and in, the East did not anticipated the speed, 
and in East Germany’s case the peaceful nature, of the revolutions throughout the Eastern 
bloc that heralded the end of the Soviet system. Contemporaneous studies, books, and 
analysis emerged amid abundant and many times contradictory to the West’s 
preponderant assumptions of the East. With the fall of East Germany now a quarter 
century in the past, a more accurate and less ideologically laden analysis can be made of 
the character of power, state, citizenship and ideology in state and society of the GDR.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The life of an East German citizen from 1949 until 1990 was defined by a more or 
less complete and total usurpation by the Stalinist party state that sought to eradicate the 
lines between private citizenry and proud party participant. The citizen of the GDR was 
coopted in many ways to participate within the party, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands (SED), through apparatus of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS or 
Stasi) and compulsory service within the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA); no personal 
social outlet—no private sphere, in the Toquevillean sense—existed as might have been 
the case in the Western democracies, with the circumscribed but absolutely vital 
exception of the church, grudgingly accepted by the powers-that-were. This thesis asks: 
How did the SED, Stasi, Volksarmee, and church in the GDR permit East Germans to 
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exercise citizenship within the construct of the GDR, and how did the interplay between 
the four predominant social institutions in East Germany first sustain and then subvert the 
totalitarian order in which they operated?  
B. IMPORTANCE  
The dissolution of the GDR and reassembly with West Germany into a single 
Germany attracted little sustained attention by the United States because of rising 
tensions within the Middle East, the Soviet thaw, and the wider dissolution of the Eastern 
Bloc during the late 1980s and 1990s. For example, the National Security Strategy of 
1988 was dominated by objectives geared toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
whereas the National Security Strategy of 1993 changed the tone and focused on 
transitioning countries, such as the Middle East and South Asia. Many of the lessons that 
could have been gleaned from the reorganization of half a continent were not realized.  
Mary Fulbrook, quoting Max Weber, notes “that it is both in principle possible, 
and indeed the historian’s distinctive task, to seek to understand the world-views of 
others, and to explore the consequences of people’s perceptions, beliefs, and values for 
their actions, under the given historical circumstance in which they find themselves.”1 In 
other words, we must look beyond the obvious, institutionalized repression of the East 
German system to explain why and how it held together for four decades. Fulbrook 
continues: “[W]hat is required is an understanding of the complexities, the shades of 
grey, the moral choices within given circumstances, that people had to face in the most 
curious historical conditions.”2 This observation is just as relevant today as it was during 
the Cold War. Reorganizations of countries, such as Africa and the Middle Eastern 
regime changes are not going away. While the lessons are not direct links, the analysis of 
how a regime can coopt a society and bend the will of the people has some merit.  
                                                 
1 Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949–1989 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), vi.  
2 Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship, x. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The GDR was an artificial regime with heavy Soviet influence, and from the 
outset, the SED was alienated from and suspicious of the population over which it 
presided. After all, while the future East Germans had spent World War II variously 
embroiled in the Nazi regime, which, among other things, was dedicated to the 
eradication of communism—and communists. David Childs explains: “By July 1952, the 
SED leadership was enough out of touch with reality to proclaim…that the GDR was 
embarking on ‘building socialism.’”3 The SED intensified its effort to institutionalize the 
class struggle within the GDR, which further alienated its citizens and caused many to 
flee to the West before the border was secured. This exodus, in turn, deepened the chasm 
between party and citizen, which was problematic with the mixed message of the 
centrality and importance of the workers and peasants to the ideology of Marxism-
Leninism. Still, even after the 1953 workers’ uprisings throughout the GDR, the basic 
idea coming from East Berlin was that the population would be won over to the socialist 
cause through the achievements of the new East German state—but the party-state 
coupled this aspiration with repressive policies and practices to enforce social 
conformity.4  
Somewhere in the process, the people were supposed to form some kind of 
evolved attachment to a state that desperately sought a unique identity as it was 
rebuilding in the aftermath of the Second World War. The GDR brought to this problem a 
totalitarian regime with the organs of state that functioned with the efficiency of the 
former Nazi regime’s Gestapo coupled with the invasiveness of the Soviet societal 
norms. The state artificially and effectively assimilated each citizen through the varying 
state apparatus and provided a framework of existence through coercion and cooption 
into the mythology of East German society. All acts and omissions were, by definition, 
political and, therefore, subject to direction and surveillance by the state. As a 
consequence, the conventional forms and expressions of citizenship—military service or  
                                                 
3 David Childs, The GDR: Moscow’s German Ally, 2nd ed. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 27.  
4 Hans-Joachim Maaz, Behind the Wall: The Inner Life of Communist Germany (New York: WW 
Norton, 1995).  
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political engagement—came to mean something else, namely state coercion, deprivation 
of personal liberties, or rigid conformity to an often shifting ideal of the “socialist 
personality.”  
Only the church provided one of the few outlets with any legitimacy of protection 
from the state—and that, only gradually. Otherwise, people came to accommodate the 
intrusions of the party state into their lives and the manipulations of the state security 
machine. And eventually, some basis for citizenship formed and flourished. One 
hypothesis holds that East German citizenship developed as it did in spite of the 
repression and coercion. An alternate hypothesis—not necessarily exclusive of the first—
is that the totalitarian aspects of the GDR did, in fact, encourage citizenship. Either way, 
the problem, from East Berlin’s perspective at least, was that in 1988 and 1989, millions 
of these East German citizens rejected the SED’s rule, if not the East German state.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. East German Exceptionalism within the Eastern Bloc 
The East German system was unique from its Eastern Bloc counterparts. Christian 
Joppke illustrates in East German dissidents and the Revolution of 1989 how the GDR 
was exceptional among a series of states, which were not considered sovereign, but more 
as “Soviet replica regimes,”5 possessing all of the attributes of a successful Soviet 
cooption. He continues to explain that without a national foundation, “East Germany was 
nothing but a Leninist regime, and socialism was elevated to a quasi-national, state- and 
society-defining ideology.”6 Joppke explains how it was difficult to manufacture dissent 
among the citizenry with no nationalistic ties and where, as he explains, “the one who did 
not comply with the socialist creed had to appear as a ‘traitor.’”7 If a significant portion 
of society subscribed to socialist ideology, then it would be difficult to break the mold 
and show discontent with the establishment. The communists’ rejection of Nazism and 
                                                 
5 Christian Joppke, East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989: Social Movement in a 
Leninist Regime (Washington Square, NY: New York University Press, 1995), 28. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 29. 
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Fascism was a catalyst for solidarity by providing a morally palpable ideology rather than 
the region’s amoral Nazi predecessors. Joppke explains two opposition movements that 
were gaining momentum within the GDR. One movement wanted to reform the GDR’s 
communism into a successful system, and the other movement consisted of dissidents 
who wanted to vacate the GDR. The GDR’s response was to deport the proponents of 
reform and keep the people who wanted to leave, causing a dangerous ideological 
combination within the state.8  
2. Methodology of Control 
Coopting society was integral to the East German regime. The youth, which Mary 
Fulbrook defines as from birth to young adulthood in the East German regime, is an 
important aspect of programming societal norms. Hans-Joachim Maaz explains in Behind 
the Wall that internally to East Germany, there existed “a banal but very effective system 
of behavioral conditioning consisting of reward and punishment were used in the total 
subjugation of a people.”9 He continues to explain: “The means of exerting pressure—
existentially, psychologically, and morally—were so comprehensive that they had to 
seriously affect most people”10 breeding a system that required total conformity, where 
any type of spontaneity would be met with stiff resistance. The consequences of either 
conformity or spontaneity would be dire at best. The unpredictability of youth can be a 
dangerous element in an unpopular society, however, the East Germans attempted to 
answer the question of their volatility. Every institution that the GDR youth could 
participate in was up for state control. The East German model felt that “it was necessary 
also to instill in young people from their earliest years the sense of belonging to a larger 
community, having wider responsibilities for a collective future.”11 Fulbrook accurately 
explains that “on the appropriate education and training of young people rests the future 
                                                 
8 Joppke, East German Dissidents, 28–31, 56, 69–70. 
9 Maaz, Behind the Wall, 8.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 115.  
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of any modern state; all advanced industrial states rely on the fostering and development 
of relevant technical expertise and an enhanced capacity for flexibility and innovation.”12  
The GDR manufactured groups that the youth could be a part of, such as the Freie 
Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth or FDJ), Pioneer association, and the Unified 
Socialist Education System, to indoctrinate the population at the youngest possible age. 
The SED was highly effective in using the duality of education for political complicity 
through indoctrination and providing a highly skilled workforce to modernize and rebuild 
the eastern realm. In 1947, Edith Bauman succinctly described the goal of total control as 
the head of the FDJ in Alan Nothnagle’s Building the East German Myth when she says:  
Let us combine the political open-mindedness and youthful combat 
readiness, which has survived from the Burschenschaften to the 
Communist Youth organization, with the nature loving life of the 
Wandervogel groups, and the Christian tolerance of the confessional 
organizations, into a unified, free youth organization encompassing all of 
German youth.13  
Nothnagle explains this as the “‘transmission belt’ between the Party and the 
younger generation,” which would lead to many future leaders of East Germany into the 
upper strata of party apparatus by creating strong bonds as early and as pervasively as 
possible.14 From cradle to grave, the SED attempted to scientifically engender a socialist 
personality of its citizens. Carolyn Höfig’s dissertation explains, “By the end of the 
socialist republic, every man, woman, and child in the GDR was organized 3.2 times in 
parties, groups, organizations, and clubs.”15 The all-encompassing, absolute nature that 
the GDR undertook via social engagement is illustrated across much of the historical 
literature.16  
                                                 
12 Fulbrook, The People’s State, 120.  
13 Alan L. Nothnagle, Building the East German Myth: Historical Mythology and Youth Propaganda 
in the German Democratic Republic, 1945–1989 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 13.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Carolyn C. Höfig, “‘Organized Cheerfulness:’ A Regional Study of Popular Culture and Identity in 
the German Democratic Republic” (PhD dissertation, University of California, Santa Cruz), 3. 
16 Fulbrook, The People’s State, 120–121.  
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The church presented a problem to the SED, which officially embraced Soviet-
style atheism. However, religion, particularly Lutheranism, retained its cultural meaning 
as well as its spiritual connections to many East Germans, and as the SED began to 
tolerate some aspects of German society that predated socialism, the church found a small 
but secure toehold. Fulbrook discusses the difficulty of the state to mesh the secular 
values of the party with the resonant religious values of the citizenry. She describes the 
state’s attempt to resuscitate “an older secular ceremony for youth, the Jugendweihe, in 
1954.”17 Fulbrook continues to explain that even though the party resurrected an 
established tradition, this tradition was still in potential conflict with a citizen’s religious 
beliefs. Religious defiance occurred between the state and the church when pastors 
refused to give religious burials to anyone who had taken part in Jugendweihe. She 
continues to explain that there was a rise in “religiously rooted dissent in schools.”18 She 
attributes some of the religious dissent of the 1960s as “part of a wider pattern of 
developments characteristic of the in part religiously influenced growth of grass-roots 
political activism in the 1980s.”19  
Peter Grothe’s book, To Win the Minds of Men, describes the dissent of the church 
and explains that “any study of counter-communist propaganda is incomplete without 
examining the role of the Christian community in East Germany.”20 Where Fulbrook had 
the luxury of dissecting the past as a historian, Grothe wrote his interpretation of the 
struggle between Christianity and communist atheism in 1958, but even then, this 
observer-participant was prophetic in accurately identifying an integral player in the 
struggle for freedom. Grothe describes the role of Bishop Dibelius, from his continued 
friction between the party and the church, as well as how he was no stranger to church 
friction. Dibelius worked on behalf of the protestant church under the Nazi’s and, up until 
his death, against the SED. The party sought to invade and exterminate every aspect of 
religion within East Germany, although freedom of religion was allowed under the 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 123. 
18 Ibid., 124. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Peter Grothe, To Win the Minds of Men: The Story of the Communist Propaganda War in East 
Germany (Palo Alto, CA: Pacific Books, 1958), 213.  
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GDR’s constitution. Fulbrook’s analysis on the role of religion is buttressed by authors 
such as Grothe when he explains that “if the Communists are to change the consciousness 
of the East German People, they must reckon with the massive roadblock of 
Christianity,”21 because to erase the deeply held ideological belief that is religion proved 
much more difficult than the SED thought. The pushing and pulling between the state and 
the church left the youth between two ideologies and would take 20 years of incubation 
until that generation would more openly question state control.22  
3. The Nationale Volksarmee as the Basis of a National Identity 
Why did the Nationale Volksarmee fail to create, instill, and perpetuate an East 
German identity, with its corresponding mythology, in similar ways that were successful 
in Prussia, Nazi Germany, nineteenth-century France, or the twentieth-century United 
States? According to Morris Janowitz: 
the contributions of the military to political modernization... are not only 
economic; the military also serves as an agent of social change. At a 
minimum, this implies that the army becomes a device for developing a 
sense of identity—a social psychological element of national unity.23  
He continues to say that this is especially important when a nation is a former 
colony or if it possesses a diverse ethnic background. This was not the case in East 
Germany; however, the SED leadership felt that it was important to use the military as a 
nationally unifying force for the new country. According to Gose’s dissertation, “the 
Soviet and East German leadership made conscious on going decisions to use the military 
in creating new political and cultural identities, as well as for reinforcing the legitimacy 
of the new communist regime on a national level.”24 The academic understanding of the 
utilization of the NVA to generate a new East German identity existed; however, the 
                                                 
21 Grothe, To Win the Minds of Men, 224. 
22 Fulbrook, The People’s State, 115–140; Grothe, To Win the Minds of Men, 212–224.  
23 Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in 
Comparative Analysis (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 80.  
24 Mark N. Gose, “The Role of the Military in Building Political Community: The Case of the Two 
German States” (PhD dissertation, University of Colorado, 1995), 104. 
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implementation of the new identity failed to take root for various reasons that Gose points 
out and is alluded to through the description of the psychology of East German citizens.25  
Peter Grothe’s description of the party leadership in 1958 described the SED as 
being isolated from its citizens. This isolation would be pervasive throughout the duration 
of the regime and extend to any state apparatus, such as the military, where an average 
citizen would mentally exclude any citizen working for the state, as the embodiment of 
the state. Only during the Vietnam War, did an overwhelming portion of the private 
citizenry in the United States view the soldier as an extension of the state, rather than as a 
representation of American idealism and values imbued within the soldier. Every other 
time in American history, the private sector of society viewed the American soldier as 
representing themselves and American values as a citizen soldier. This was not 
necessarily the case in the East German epoch. Gose illustrates the heavy handedness by 
the SED to infiltrate the soldier into society through pairing of military units with 
“schools, local governments, and factories in so-called ‘patron relationships.’”26 The 
logic of the SED was that increased presence directly correlated to increased influence, 
however, this did not necessarily reflect the feelings of society by its disconnected nature.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The primary literature covers a historical analysis of the unique, if stylized, East 
German civic narrative, as well as through, but not restricted to, the following additional 
works: Building the East German Myth,27 German Democratic Republic,28 and Behind 
the Wall: The Inner Life of Communist Germany.29 In this aspect, the proposed research 
will employ the methods of contemporary history, an approach that applies historical 
analysis to events of the recent past and even the present. 
                                                 
25 Janowitz, Military in the Political Development, 80–82; Gose, “Role of the Military in Building 
Political Community,” 100–106.  
26 Gose, “Role of the Military in Building Political Community,” 110. 
27 Nothnagle, Building the East German Myth. 
28 Mike Dennis, German Democratic Republic: Politics, Economics, and Society (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1988). 
29 Maaz, Behind the Wall. 
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It also will borrow some concepts and frameworks from the subfield of 
“domination and self-definition” (Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn), which, in the case of the 
GDR, “focuses on the ‘changing reciprocal relationship between the dictatorial leadership 
… and the manifold ways … in which the people dealt with it.’”30 Thus, other source 
material will examine everyday life as derived from texts about the SED, Stasi, and 
church written during the East German regime, as well as texts that focus on a 
contemporary post-communist historical analysis since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 
through the following additional titles: The Stasi;31 Stasi: Shield and Sword of the 
Party;32 Origins of a Spontaneous Revolution;33 Germany East: Dissent and 
Opposition,34 “Collective Identity and Informal Groups in Revolutionary Mobilization: 
East Germany in 1989,”35 and “Dissident Groups, Personal Networks, and Spontaneous 
Cooperation: The East German Revolution of 1989.”36  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. The failure of the East German regime 
cannot be parsimoniously summed up into a few faults or flaws in its implementation of 
control. The chapters will provide a broad framework to incorporate a range of 
characteristics of the East German regime in order to frame the narrative in a way to 
show how each component of the GDR worked in concert. Chapter I will serve as the 
introduction and detail the appropriate questions to be answered. Chapter II will 
historically frame the idea of East German exceptionalism among the Soviet Bloc 
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satellite states and show how the previous Nazi regime set the Soviet Union up for 
successful cooption of society. Chapter III will historically frame how the SED 
amalgamated key aspects of society—from the intellectuals, education of its citizens, and 
mass organizations—to the political. Chapter IV will discuss the methodology of control 
by the SED, focusing on the Stasi as the primary player and agent of control, as well as, 
the seeming impenetrability of the church. Chapter V analyzes how the SED recognized 
the importance of the Volksarmee as an agent of national unity and how it failed to 
provide that service throughout its history. Chapter VI will connect the comprehensive 
nature of total control of GDR citizenry and explain its ultimate failure as a state with 
dissent within and through the church as the primary actor.  
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II. FROM NAZIS TO EAST GERMANS 
The East German case of Soviet cooptation is unique because East Germany’s 
domestic situation allowed the Soviet Union to graft its communist ideology and 
methodology of control onto former Nazi Germany, at least in its own zone of 
occupation. The preconditions under which this transformation took place are important 
in order to make sense of the extreme methods of control at the height of the GDR.  
Moscow’s first challenge in German territory was overcoming the intellectual and 
emotional legacy of the war—in which the Nazi side pledged the complete annihilation 
of all things Soviet. To mitigate any remnant anti-bolshevism, Stalin employed the 
“Moscow” German communists, who had spent the Nazi years in exile in the Soviet 
Union. They provided the German face of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Zone of 
occupation—while remaining absolutely loyal not just to the Soviet Union but to Stalin, 
in particular.  
A. CONDITIONS FOR REFORM 
As Nazism was in its final throes, David Childs explains, the Germans observed 
the Allies invading from both directions, wresting control of the Fatherland from the 
Nazis. Only then “most of them soon recognized the true face of National Socialism and 
turned to other values.”37 At the end of the war with the total collapse of the Third Reich, 
any narrative sounded better to the German population than National Socialism, which 
had brought so much destruction and misery. At the same time, the German population 
was accustomed to a highly structured environment, which Hitler used as a way to 
organize, mobilize, and weaponize the masses. The incoming regime in the Soviet Zone 
of Occupation (SBZ) would take advantage of this desire for order in the wake of the 
war.38  
To be sure, few Germans were in the market for more ideology. Against the 
backdrop of acute devastation within the Soviet Zone, the German society was shattered 
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and existed at the edges of the basic levels of survival, where “not utopian hopes” as 
described by Fulbrook, “but everyday fears and struggles for physical and psychological 
survival”39 dominated the day-to-day psyche of Germans. The Communists knew it—and 
used the circumstances to their advantage. As Anton Ackerman, a member of the 
Ulbricht team who returned to Germany even before the war officially ended to stake the 
Communist claim, recalled:  
What we met was a people in agony. That is the truth. They were 
paralysed by the poison of despair equally weighed down by the traumatic 
experience of nightly air raids and the other horrors of war, the carefully 
nurtured fear of bolshevism and the awareness of their shared 
responsibility for the fate that had befallen Germany.40 
The fact of the occupation also contributed to the spirit of the times. Childs notes that 
“some Germans were just too terrified, especially of the Red Army, to do anything other 
than obey their new masters.”41 The battle would be uphill because of the long-standing 
fear of bolshevism and distaste for the Russian occupants within eastern Germany, 
however, through careful political rhetoric that would change.42  
Marxism-Leninism, propagated by the Moscow German communists, presented 
itself as a powerful path to peace. Ulbricht’s Party rhetoric at the same time linked 
Western powers and Nazism together as the collective enemy to peace and 
reconstruction. Nothnagle describes how the communists seized on this situation for the 
creation of an “anti-fascist myth” or what he terms as “ex post facto antifascism,”43 
conceived as an extension of capitalism, the prime ideological foe of communism. The 
future argued for communism in Germany, according to the new leadership in the SBZ.44 
So did the past, it turned out. The Nazi regime that preceded the GDR set the 
stage for a Marxist interpretation of a post-war German state and, with a minor 
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rebranding of German history, fit within the aims of the returning communist party. On 
the one hand, the connection to the past was negative: Nazi malfeasance led to the allied 
invasion of Germany and all the destruction that went with it. Because the National 
Socialists always stood opposed to organized labor and the socialist-inflected parties, 
however, the communists could, on the other hand, connect the SBZ/GDR to the 
“progressive” aspects of German history.45 Mike Dennis writes that the manufactured 
narrative of the incoming communists held that “the GDR depicts itself as the 
culmination and embodiment of the long history of the German labour movement.”46At 
last, with the coming of the Moscow German communists, at least a part of Germany was 
poised to realize the promise as the birthplace of Marx and Engels and a former shining 
light of socialist activism.47 
Many of the prominent communists in Germany during the war either fled 
Germany or were interred by the Nazis. The return of these men offered legitimacy to 
communism’s cause by highlighting their imprisonment and struggles during the war. 
This allowed the communists to quickly insert the narrative that, as Childs explains, 
“represent the KPD as the only political party to have defended the interests of the 
workers, resisted militarism and imperialism and to have waged the struggle against 
fascism with determination and from an early date.”48 However, Fulbrook notes that the 
efforts of these men were “conducted from the relative safety of Stalin’s Soviet Union.”49 
Their stay in the Soviet Union allowed for a closer relationship to their communist 
brethren when rebuilding the state. Corey Ross’s position on the new German communist 
leader’s interpretation of Soviet intervention is in conflict with the feeling of German 
society. The German communists attempted to construct a new historical narrative 
positing that “the Soviets were seen as crucial to the establishment of the GDR, any 
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notions of ‘imperialism’ or outright ‘dependence’ were emphatically rejected.”50 The 
official narrative that gained wide acceptance was that “the creators of the GDR were 
German communists,”51 which was essential due to German distrust and contempt for the 
Soviets. It additionally provided legitimacy and the needed veil of sovereignty over 
German territory, rather than the common perception of Soviet control.52 
By manufacturing the mythology of a workers’ struggle, GDR historians 
addressed the actions of a significant number of KPD members. Continuity of a struggle 
was paramount to their case so they could overcome the ubiquitous feeling of increasing 
Sovietization. Nothnagle’s interpretation is that the KPD members, Pieck, Ulbricht, and 
Honecker, who fled to Moscow adopted the legacy of antifascists under Nazi rule as “a 
moral imperative” to direct “the struggle against both the FRG and opposition within the 
GDR,” emphasizing “a direct continuation of the antifascist resistance struggle.”53 
Nothnagle also concedes that antifascist sentiments among the communists were not 
always clear through their actions during the war, however, the German communists’ 
rhetoric accentuated their struggle against the Nazis. Nothnagle claims that a bipolar 
relationship existed where “the Communists wavered in their policies toward the 
National Socialists and alternately fought them and cooperated with them in their mutual 
struggle to overthrow the Weimar Republic.”54  
Nothnagle notes that a coherent political position for or against National 
Socialism stemmed from the German communists’ confusion regarding National 
Socialist platforms in the early 1920s. The interaction between the two groups was not as 
black and white as the relationship between National Socialism and Judaism illustrated 
by the actions of communists interred in the concentration camps during the war. 
Nothnagle describes how “communist inmates systematically collaborated with the SS in 
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order to save the lives of their comrades.”55 Whether this was done for self-preservation 
or the preservation of the party is up for debate, however, the collusion with the Nazis in 
order to obtain preferential treatment, as well as avoid eventual extermination, is 
undisputable. In an effort to overshadow unfavorable elements of history, the communists 
emphasized Marx’s inevitable class struggle and simultaneously downplayed the role of 
their willing assistance in the prison camps. The necessary invention of a communist 
“‘us”‘ versus a capitalist “‘them”‘ mantra helped create an ideologically tangible and 
contrastable duo.56 
The communists carefully constructed a Marxist-Engelsian interpretation of 
German history, positing Nazism and fascism as the ultimate stage of capitalist 
development before an impending proletarian revolution. As Dennis writes, “according to 
GDR accounts, national socialism is not an accident in German history but an intrinsic 
product of capitalism.”57 Thus, the incoming leadership provided a path-dependent 
chronology of how the GDR should be constructed and eventually function in the future 
if it wanted to achieve full communism, while avoiding a reversion into fascism or even 
any of the dangerous tendencies that might allow fascism to bloom again. Highlighting 
the impending (and ever-present) encroachment of fascism invoked an external historical 
threat during postwar reconstruction; the GDR leadership’s consistently insisted that 
“capitalism in the Federal Republic can still serve as an incubator of fascism.”58 The 
physical condition of the Soviet Zone and the desperate state of the German people set 
the ideological battlefield between the East’s communism and the West’s capitalism—
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evident until well into the 1960s), the East had its ideological superiority. The only 
precondition was accepting the Soviet Union as a mentor state in the indeterminate 
transformation.59  
B. CHANGE IN COURSE FROM ANTI-BOLSHEVISM TO TRUSTED 
SOVIET AGENT 
Mary Fulbrook describes the German sentiment of Soviet control:  
The replacement of Nazi dictatorship by a communist dictatorship—with a 
very different ideology and in principle far more humanistic set of goals, 
yet with a comparable disregard for individual human rights and liberal 
notions of freedom—was for many Germans a traumatic experience.60 
She acknowledges that this explanation of German society applied variously 
among the different sectors of society, and in some cases the adjustment to communism 
was “class-specific, and highly variable according to political and moral standpoints.”61 
Jochen Laufer explains the dismantling of the German state in the Soviet Zone, 
administered by the Soviet Military Administration called the SMAD or SVAG, as “an 
instrument aimed at weakening the German grande bourgeoisie.”62 He continues that the 
majority of the population was opposed to the Soviet dismantling of Germany because 
“[they] saw their own existence threatened by the drastic measures employed,”63 which is 
a natural response when a new regime attempts to redistribute and reorder society. 
Additionally, the German people were determining how to come to grips with the long-
term effects of this new order as well. Laufer notes that “the ‘antifascist democratic 
transformation’ of society promoted by the SVAG and the SED led to conditions in the 
SBZ that were increasingly similar to those of other states within the Soviet sphere of  
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influence.”64 The next logical step of analysis would lead to the conclusion that the 
Soviets executed a coherent policy in all of their satellite states, but this was not 
necessarily the case.65  
The Soviets worked through the process of controlling and coercing the differing 
Eastern Bloc states, more by feel than strategic grand design. Ross concedes that a 
coherent Soviet policy toward Germany did not exist in the way it was portrayed by the 
West. He concluded that many of the Soviet goals were contradictory and erratic. Even 
through the explanation by official documents that were discovered in the East German 
archives from 1990 to 1991, little light was shed on the coherency of policy toward a 
positioning of a unified or divided Germany in the eyes of the Soviets.66  
C. THE SED’S COALESCENCE INTO A DOMINANT POLITICAL FORCE 
The method for how to reorganize society lay in the German desire for a high 
degree of organization. The SED’s answer was through political apparati that were in the 
process of being built in concert with the rest of the infrastructure within the SBZ. In the 
SED’s view, all mass organizations are inherently political, and these mass organizations 
would become the primary transmission belt between the party and the people. The first 
hurdle was to create a strong central political party whose message could be promulgated 
as a single voice, and this streamlining of the political required the consolidation of 
political parties in order to assert control. The SED became the primary organ and had its 
origins within a loosely aligned set of bodies that promoted communist ideologies.  
The SED was composed of the convenient marriage between the Communist 
Party of Germany (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). The two 
parties were at odds with each other and from “1929 onward SPD and KPD usually faced 
each other as bitter enemies.”67 Dennis notes that as the threat of fascism grew, the two 
groups could no longer effectively oppose each other, while effectively fighting against 
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the Nazis. This provided a platform where “in 1936 and at the ‘Berne’ conference in 
1939, it proposed a broad alliance with other antifascist groups culminating in a 
democratic people’s republic,”68 which had reverberating effects in the post war political 
arena. This was a major step in cementing the alliance and would “provide an element of 
legitimacy to the attempt to implement an antifascist democratic revolution.”69 In the 
end, the Nazis were unknowingly instrumental in aligning these political parties during 
the Third Reich, which gave them immense power after the war. Anti-fascist 
galvanization occurred while the non-NSDAP parties were excised from Germany during 
the war, many ending up in the USSR.70  
The KPD’s leadership’s expulsion during the Second World War allowed for a 
closer relationship to emerge between them and the Soviets. Part of this relationship was 
through Stalin’s purges, as he would have allowed only the Germans who were most 
ideologically devoted to communism to remain. Nothnagle explains that “by 1945 the 
majority of German Communist party members had been liquidated by either the Nazis 
or the Soviets.”71 The few who were left standing, among them Walter Ulbricht, Anton 
Ackermann, and Gustav Sobottka, were the devoted few that lasted through a period of 
ideologically personal turmoil in Europe where either the Nazis denounced their affinity 
for communism, or the Soviets viewed their German nationality as suspect. Through their 
stay in the Soviet Union during the war were they able to achieve legitimacy as they 
aided the Soviet Union against the Wehrmacht during the war through the framework of 
the National Committee for a Free Germany and the Association of German Officers 
located in Moscow. Their primary role consisted of translating propaganda for the 
purpose of converting Wehrmacht POWs in the Soviet Union that provided leverage for 
the USSR and legitimacy for the German communists in Stalin’s eyes.72  
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Even after the German “Moscow Communists” returned to Germany, the Soviets 
and German communists continued to enjoy and nurture close relations with their Soviet 
handlers during reconstruction. Bruce Allen affirms that the erection of the East German 
state “commenced with the arrival of the Red Army together with the émigré leadership 
of the German Communist Party.”73 
If, then, the path to legitimacy lay with the restoration of basic services, the 
communists were able to achieve all of the above with the help of the Soviet Military 
Administration. Allen states that “from the outset the KPD’s émigré leadership, 
functioning under Soviet guidance, started to emerge as the leading social and political 
force in the Soviet occupied zone.”74 The three main groups that facilitated this were the 
Ulbricht group, the Ackermann Group, and the Sobottka Group. These groups attached 
themselves to Berlin, Saxony, and Mecklenburg respectively and were the only groups 
the Soviets allowed. Their task was to win over the population within their specified 
areas through propaganda that denounced Nazism, militarism, and racism. Although they 
were not, at this point, to create an overwhelming communist appearance, they also were 
sent with explicit instructions to thwart the advent of any truly independent political 
organizations. They were to grow their movement quietly from within the Soviet Zone in 
order to change the German sentiments toward Soviet authority and communism. The 
personnel office that would select and register party officials was to be staffed by “a 
comrade who in the last few years has worked as an anti-Fascist functionary outside 
Germany,”75 leaving only a very reliable few able to serve.76  
The KPD was not the sole party within the Soviet zone at this time, but it was a 
predominant party, along with the SPD. The political leadership campaigned for a 
reversal of policy regarding the German dissatisfaction with the Soviets and disgust for 
bolshevism in order to facilitate a rapid transition in sentiment toward their post war ally. 
Dennis also explains that according to Rölf Badstübner, “in 1945 the Soviet Union did 
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not wish to impose its own system on the Zone nor to export revolution.”77 Ross shares 
Naimark’s opinion in the argument that “Soviet officers bolshevized the zone not because 
there was a plan to do so, but because that was the only way they knew to organize 
society,”78 to which he further explains that it was “as much a matter of mentality and 
social instincts as of articulated policies.”79 This is not to say that the creation of the East 
German state was a total accident, but more of a continual reaction to unfolding events at 
the time rather than through the concept of a planned strategic end state crafted by either 
the Soviets or the German communists.80  
In a society that yearned for organization, the idea of a desired end state was 
needed to strengthen the communist mandate, and was thus incorporated into SED 
narrative to facilitate the inevitability of class struggle. A separate eastern sector of 
Germany was not the intended political end state for the Soviets, which Dennis posits 
with “the surprisingly early recognition of political parties, before their authorization in 
the Western zones, was determined by SMAD’s wish to influence the development of 
political parties throughout the whole of Germany.”81 The Soviets allowed, along with 
the SPD and KPD, the establishment of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD), all of which would form the core of the anti-fascist 
movement as a reaction to Germany’s involvement with Nazism. During this period of 
restoration, Dennis points out that the KPD enjoyed preferential treatment from the 
Soviets, which caused some resentment among the other parties. This promoted the 
merging of political entities into the SED, in order to consolidate power and influence in 
the Soviet Zone. The renaming of the party to the Socialist Unity Party could also be 
portrayed as a way to reduce tensions with the West’s increasing skepticism of 
communism. The poor election results in Austria and Hungary hastened the political 
fusion of the KPD and the SPD into the SED. The merger also provided a way to take 
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advantage of the KPD’s preferential treatment by the Soviets, but led to fundamental 
ideological creep that sought more cooperation with Moscow.82  
For the rest of the existence of the GDR, the SED was able to play against Ross’s 
two distinct factors. Ross describes how “the GDR had something distinctly ‘German’ 
about it that set it apart from other communist states. From Moscow’s perspective (as 
well as East Berlin’s) this aspect of the GDR wanted careful refocusing: on its unique 
relationship with its West German rival state and its attempts to deal with the Nazi 
past.”83  
Throughout the existence of the GDR, the opposition state of a capitalist Federal 
Republic simply lay on the other side of the border, a constant a thorn in the GDR’s side, 
as the permeation of Western influence was a continual threat. East Germany was the 
only Eastern Bloc country that possessed an ethnic twin to which comparisons could also 
be drawn. The state was constantly unable to fill its utopian promise to its citizens, which 
caused growing resentment that could only be quelled using the herd mentality of SED 
sponsored mass organizations.84 Although they were devout in their belief that 
communism would overtake capitalism, it was too dangerous for the Party, according to 
Nothnagle, to “let the younger generation experience the shortcomings of capitalism as 
practiced in the Federal Republic and West Berlin without letting them experience the 
benefits as well.”85 The state understood the impact of consumer goods in relation to its 
Western counterparts with the June 1953 uprising. According to Fulbrook, one of the 
main lessons learned was that the state needed to attend to the consumer needs of its 
citizens by making it a top priority.86 Although consumer socialism grew with goods that 
the state provided, it never kept pace with Western standards. While the SED’s rhetoric 
was constantly deriding the fascist and capitalist nature of its twin state, the fruits of the 
GDR’s command economy did not overtake the West.  
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In contrast, Nazism was a complex psychological problem for the SED to 
overcome. The Third Reich had espoused highly polemic racist views as one of its major 
platforms. Maaz explains that the SED’s purging and denazifying of society provided a 
blanket to cover up the past where “the vast majority of Germans … had been 
enthusiastic activists or had at least been willing followers.”87 Almost from the 
beginning, denazification—as a way to zeroize the past—and anti-fascism—whose 
origins were not to be discussed—became an unquestionable mythology within the GDR. 
At the top were the SED functionaries who retained legitimacy in the eyes of the people 
for their struggle against the Nazis during the war years. The denazification of society 
occurred to varying degrees based on the complexity of the profession and its importance 
to making society function, however, the hostility and legitimacy of the SED leadership 
created an environment where the past was discarded regardless of profession in the 
newly formed environment.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The German population was destroyed and shattered in the wake of the Second 
World War. The dispelled German communists in Moscow during the war manufactured 
the myth of continuity upon their return and transposed the antifascist disillusionment 
with the Nazi regime onto the Western zones of occupation. This juxtaposed the anti-
bolshevist stance of Nazi Germany with an antifascist position and allowed for the 
reviled Soviets to remain behind the scenes for a fear of rekindling past hate. Devout 
communists with a German façade developed the SED to satiate the organizational 
desires of the citizens of a highly functioning state as Stalin was creating his buffer with 
the West. Stalin’s political acumen allowed him to leave his options open, aiming for a 
neutral Germany under his influence, but settling for a vital ally in Marxism-Leninism.  
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III. ACHIEVING TOTAL CONTROL 
During the transformation of the Soviet zone into the German Democratic 
Republic, the party-state formed that insinuated itself deeply and enduringly in the 
everyday lives of its citizens—making good on both the Marxist-Leninist ideal of the 
fully politicized “new man” and the Stalinist need for constant social monitoring and 
control. The only way a system like this could exist is by design. This is not to say that 
every aspect was planned from the outset; however, using the tools and institutions 
available, the party-state could coopt and/or control its citizens through carefully crafted 
mechanisms that thrived for nearly half a century.  
Through the use of the intelligentsia, the Germans and Soviets sought to rapidly 
reestablish institutions that were destroyed during the war, in an effort to control and 
conform society to embrace the benefits of a worker’s paradise and its guiding Marxist-
Leninist ideology. The SED understood the impact of state education as a medium for 
transmitting the ideological message to the youngest citizens and exploited its pivotal role 
to the maximum extent. The SED redefined the educational role it played in its citizens’ 
lives by extending its educational influence to the SED’s interpretation of the socialist 
family. In addition to the time spent at school and with the family, the state created mass 
social organizations from the ground up to have a clean break with its past and infused 
these organizations with SED ideology so the socialist personality never had an 
opportunity to stray. One mass organization, outside the relative purview of the state, was 
the church; making a clean break with its historical past difficult while providing 
hazardous connections external to the SED’s geographical control. The SED accurately 
identified the most critical elements to facilitate the subversion of society. 
A. THE AMALGAMATION OF THE OLD AND NEW INTELLIGENTSIA 
The intelligentsia is unique to Eastern European political structures and the group 
possesses a specific function within society. That function is not in the same realm as the 
Western notion of intellectuals as a group, but rather the wider array of a specifically 
designed group with a political agenda. As Thomas Baylis notes, “The term itself is of 
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Russian origin; it refers to those individuals with specialized technical, scientific, and 
managerial skills who directly or indirectly do the brain work of the process of material 
production.”88 As regards the East German variety, Baylis writes: 
The technical intelligentsia in the German Democratic Republic (DDR) is 
an example of an infrequent but fascinating social phenomenon: a stratum 
consciously created by a political regime as an instrument for furthering 
its goals for remaking society.89 
The SED decreed that “the new intelligentsia was to be drawn largely from the working 
and peasant classes and was to emerge from a greatly expanded and reformed educational 
system.”90 This new class would bridge the old intelligentsia with the new socialist order. 
This group of people provided the skeleton of infrastructure and guidance that would get 
the state functioning. Once the state was functioning, a methodology for the replacement 
of the old intelligentsia with a highly motivated cadre of true believers that were home 
grown within the East German state would begin to provide the meat to this skeletal 
system in hopes that society would organically grow. The technical intelligentsia would 
create a league of intelligentsia who mechanically responded to political interactions. 
Their influence on every day society was not as pervasive as the artistic intellectuals.91  
The trick was finding, growing, and retaining the critical mass of people to take 
up the necessary positions in the party and in production. While Baylis contends that 
there are no exact figures, the general feeling of human capital flight, “together with the 
high rate of German war casualties, left East Germany with a critical shortage of trained 
technical personnel and with an acute gap in the age brackets from which such a deficit 
might most easily be filled.”92 From the vantage of 1958, Peter Grothe emphasized the 
perils of this brain drain, noting that “no state can lose its youth and still expect to be 
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viable”93 as well as that “this exodus has had a crippling effect on the DDR economy, 
since half of the recent refugees have been under twenty-five years old.”94 Refugees 
emerged from every class of citizen, but the losses in the ranks of the new intelligentsia 
were most devastating to the fledgling East Germany.95  
Ulbricht and his comrades in the party and state leadership hoped that progress in 
reconstruction and stabilization would encourage the masses to stay in East Germany. 
However, nearly two decades after the end of the war, the GDR was still losing valuable 
people—workers, farmers, intellectuals, experts. Mary Fulbrook explains, “it was only 
the building of the Berlin Wall that finally put a stop to the haemorrhage.”96 Once the 
wall was built in August 1961, the SED could count on a reasonably stable 
intelligentsia—though arguably the party-state needed these figures even more acutely to 
form and guide the captive society. 
In this connection, the artistic intellectuals became important tools of the party. 
They communicated to the masses according to the strictures of Socialist Realism, which 
was as much a political program as it was an expressive approach. Socialist realism spoke 
to the actualities of society at the time, displaying the workers in their own environment, 
while also instilling optimism about where communism would take society. Particularly 
in the 1950s, Socialist Realism was not merely the preferred aesthetic of the GDR 
leadership; it was the only acceptable form, the only style of art or literature that would 
receive official support or sanction.97 
In East Germany, the linkage between art and the party served most obviously to 
silence all forms of dissent. It also helped neutralize a segment of society that, left to its 
own devices, might be or become politically unreliable. Few intellectuals would give up 
their access to the tools of their art, their audiences, or their exalted position in society 
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(all from the party) to engage in open criticism. It was not just that this tame “opposition” 
adopted the language of the “values, institutions, and individuals with whom they were in 
conflict.”98 They became active and willing tools of the party-state. In the end, some of 
the more influential artists—Heiner Müller, Christa Wolf, Sascha Anderson, and Reiner 
Schedlinski—cooperated with the Stasi, even as they created public personas around their 
own purported persecution by the authorities.  
Ironically, the artistic intelligentsia usually was afforded greater freedom of 
movement, especially to Western nations, where they were often feted as dissidents. Such 
trips allowed the GDR to revoke citizenship and distance the SED from dissidents if they 
did not continue to tow the party line, as in the case of Wolf Biermann’s exile in 1976. 
By the 1980s, however, East Germany’s prominent artists and writers—unlike their 
counterparts in Czechoslovakia and Poland—were thoroughly embedded in the party-
state apparatus.99 
B. EDUCATION: BUILDING THE SOCIALIST PERSONALITY 
Such drastic punitive measures as Biermann’s expatriation or the lesser 
repressions that kept the artists in line were only part of the East German approach. In 
order to get true believers among the technicians and the artisans, the SED had to create a 
comprehensive system of educating the population so that everyone functioned for the 
good of the party.100 Communists as far back as Marx understood that education was an 
important vehicle to grow their ideological base. As Grothe puts it, “any communist will 
say straightway that it is unthinkable that an education system can exist without a primary 
political mission.”101 The East German leaders thus knew that they had to infuse 
communist ideology at every level; however, they knew the true value could not be 
realized for generations, particularly because they had to overcome the legacy of Nazi 
socialization and a less-than-triumphant switch to socialism. Dorothee Wierling explains 
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that “it was the whole population, every citizen of the GDR, which appeared in need of 
education, if only because they had not fought for socialism in a revolution, and it had 
been imposed on them by military force and repressive politics.”102 The communists, 
Soviet and German, also understood the malleability of young minds and the role that 
education could and would play to further their cause. Grothe quotes Gerhart Eisler when 
he “pounded his fist on the table as he told [Grothe], ‘The hope of our Republic lies in the 
youth. We can not expect the older ones to change their ways, but the youth, they must be 
convinced of the superiority of Communism.’”103 Grothe continues to assert that 
educational indoctrination system within the DDR was “the most strategic propaganda 
operation.”104  
Much in the same way that industry reopened in a landscape of destruction 
quickly after the war, education was also quickly reinstituted in the Soviet Zone. Childs 
gives credit to the opening of schools on the first day of October 1945 as “this must have 
represented a considerable achievement on the part of the Soviet administration and their 
German helpers.”105 Grothe, writing from the contemporary perspective, said: “[O]ne has 
the feeling, as one views East German education, that students are being produced in the 
same sense that war materiel are produced.”106  
The educational system was extremely important in building the East German 
state from the ground up ideologically speaking, so the system went through a series of 
reforms from the time education started after the war through the 1950s. Fulbrook 
explains that “the 1946 Law for the Democratisation of German Schools was the first step 
in a process of removing the influence of both religion and of inherited wealth and 
privilege from schools.”107 This system was reorganized a few times through the 1950s, 
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developing special cases of children with aptitudes in areas that were outside the normal 
scope of school with the Law on the Unified Socialist Education System of 1965 under 
Margot Honecker. (Margot Honecker was the wife of the future leader of the GDR, Erich 
Honecker, and would maintain the office of Minister of Education until the fall of the 
GDR in 1989.)  
The ideological root of Honecker’s educational reforms centered on what she 
called Erziehung zum Hass, “education to hate.” John Rodden quotes Frau Honecker: 
“Educating youth to a deep love of their Heimat, the German Democratic Republic, and 
educating them toward socialism means: to teach them to hate imperialism.”108 In order 
to display a love and bond with the state, hatred must be directed toward the West. Much 
of the curriculum under Honecker held this as a core value. The coordination of curricula 
within the GDR’s education system consisted of an increase in NVA film propaganda as 
well as anti-imperialist thematic topics in the ninth and tenth grades. Since education, 
from the perspective of the GDR continued outside of the classroom, the Young Pioneers 
also advanced these same themes. Rodden explains that even the head of the Pioneers, 
Helga Labs, advocated to educators across the GDR that “such hatred is born out of love 
for our socialist Fatherland, and gives us the power to do everything possible for its 
defense and protection.”109 The SED had coopted TV personalities to promulgate this 
message of hate toward the West and even went so far as to invoke passages from the 
bible to justify this mindset of hatred. With Frau Honecker at the helm of education, 
Fulbrook explains that this system “provided a unified structure and philosophy of 
education running more or less from infancy to senility,”110 coopting every single person 
with a blueprint of their educational life in the state’s pursuit of the development of the 
total socialist personality.  
The East German education system had significant advantages over the West’s, 
specifically in technical curricula, but lacked a lot of the soft sciences that were deemed 
politically unstable, or generally unneeded by the SED. These shortcomings are extolled 
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by Fulbrook in her critiques of the educational system in the GDR. She asserts that 
because the soft sciences existed outside the technical nature of the society that the SED 
aimed to create, “many accounts see the GDR education system almost entirely in terms 
of ‘breaking one’s backbone,’ or as an ‘educational dictatorship.’”111 Regimented 
learning can only produce so much for the greater good if orthogonal modes of thinking, 
as deemed by the state, are stamped out of the youth.112  
C. THE SOCIALIST FAMILY 
The East German focus was not on forming well-rounded individuals through 
education but on creating a politicized and obedient society. Thus, education—or, better, 
didactics—suffused all aspects of the GDR. Mary Fulbrook states, “there was to be no 
area of society uncontrolled by the state, the organization of which was the penetration 
even to the most basic, fundamental level of society.”113 The concept was that no person 
existed as an individual, but rather as a segment of the bigger picture to push forward 
communism within East Germany. All work, education, free time, and leisure activities 
were either closely controlled or monitored by the government. Furthermore, “parents 
had a duty to bring their children up to become loyal, obedient, committed subjects of the 
communist state.”114  
In a twofold attack on dissent, the communists needed to absorb the children into 
the appropriate state ideology as early as possible, as well as get the mothers, who would 
traditionally rear children until school age, into the work force. SED propaganda fostered 
the notion that production would fall short if women remain an untapped resource 
method of production, and this also allowed the state a legitimate excuse to insert 
themselves into the traditional role of a parental unit. From an educational perspective, 
East German-trained psychologist Joachim Maaz writes, “the goal of state education can 
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be summed up as follows: to inhibit individuality and break the individual’s will” to 
which “this principle was carried out relentlessly at all levels of public education.”115 
Parents went along with the strict rules regarding child rearing, such as potty training and 
displays of affection because the state helped with behavior modification, especially with 
the absenteeism of the women.116  
To be different, or stand out among the highly conformist society within East 
Germany would spell certain doom for the individual causing increased scrutiny on the 
family. Maaz cites, “most women (83.2 percent of the able-bodied female population) 
had jobs, an indication of the success of government propaganda in convincing mothers 
that their role lay in the workplace, not at home with their children.”117 The narrative that 
accompanied women in the workforce to achieve full production potential was not 
unfounded. The spike in women’s work force participation was partly caused by the loss 
of male life during the Second World War, as well as the population migration west, so 
every able-bodied person needed to contribute to the new East German society in order 
for it to function.  
Once the idea that women should be working spread, thereby putting the children 
within the state’s sphere of influence during large time blocks during the workday, the 
communist indoctrination could begin. Dennis cites the importance of turning over 
children in the GDR so both parents could pursue work, causing, “in 1985, 72.7 percent 
of all children aged 0–3 attended a crèche and 89.9 percent aged 3–6, a kindergarten.”118 
Fulbrook explains that society’s needs to get the workforce mobilized aided in the 
childcare requirements that were provided by the state. The SED manufactured a certain 
symbiosis between meeting production needs and providing the social-welfare network to 
meet parental concerns. No excuse was available to parents for opting out of work, unless 
a family wanted to highlight themselves as different and therefore non-conformist in the  
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eyes of the government. This furthers Maaz’s assertion that the effects of a socialist 
upbringing can be observed because SED influence was imposed on children from the 
earliest age conceivable for indoctrination.119  
Ross raises the question: “Is there any point in talking about East German 
‘society’ as a realm more or less distinct from ‘politics’?”120 Because the lines are 
blurred to a level that was even avoided by East Germany itself in the analysis of its 
citizens, this makes the problem of parsing them a problematic endeavor. In many cases 
within East Germany, society and politics could not be decoupled, and if they were 
forcibly or naturally decoupled, this would provide a seam to express dissent. School-
mandated education was linked with businesses to facilitate a transition for the 
individuals to enter the workforce once the minimum schooling was completed. This 
connection also provided a cognitive association between school curricula and the overall 
understanding of how education fed into the state system of production for the whole of 
society.  
D. THE GDR’S INVASION INTO SOCIAL SPHERES 
The SED sought to place itself at the interstices of state and society through the 
use of mass organizations in order to maximize the infiltration of the private realm. In 
order to quell dissidence among the citizens, all mass organizations within the GDR were 
fashioned and organized to advocate SED ideals, or at least create a reasonable façade 
through repeated profession of the anti-fascist and anti-Nazi mythology. The German 
psyche lent itself to these social organizations causing a citizens’ greatest fear to be 
ostracism within a country where you could not vote with his or her feet after 1961, and 
many, before the establishment of the wall, simply would not pick up and move. Maaz 
asserts, “in this system only those who conformed could remain unmolested.”121 The  
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psychological drive for organization of the people allowed for the efficacy of the mass 
organizations to flourish within the GDR further allowing the transmission of party 
values.122  
The mass organizations that became primary sources of party ideology were the 
Society for German-Soviet Friendship League (Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft or 
DSF), the Free German Trade Union Federation (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund or 
FDGB), and the FDJ—of which the Young Pioneers were a subsidiary. Höfig elucidates 
the use of “giant associations that the SED created to bring socialist society to the people, 
to create the collective, to bring ideology to the public and to connect citizens to the 
system in manifold ways for stability’s sake.”123 Höfig asserts that these state institutions 
“replaced the independent organization of civil society and served to bind individual 
citizens to the official order.”124 These mass organizations would break down the spheres 
of private life and blend it with the political reality, merging them into a single sphere.125  
1. German-Soviet Friendship League  
The German-Soviet Friendship League (DSF) was an organization whose mission 
was to expose the German population to Soviet culture; however, the Soviets later used it 
as a primary vehicle for transmitting propaganda. The reception of this organization and 
the mass involvement of many citizens of the GDR can be explained through the lens of 
the post-war political landscape. Many older citizens felt that volunteering to participate 
in this mass organization somehow absolved them of their past involvement with the 
Third Reich, and for the younger generation, it was something that they just accepted as 
part of their everyday existence and its process of socialization within the GDR. The DSF 
boasted one of the largest memberships of any of the mass organizations, especially  
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toward the end of the GDR, which is seemingly at odds with the dislike shared between 
Germans and Soviets.126 Formal membership, if not enthusiastic participation, was 
socially expected by the 1980s, at the latest.  
2. The All-Union Union 
The political base in any communist country is the worker, and the way in which 
the SED organized its working population would be through a trade union, the All-Union 
Union (FDGB). This was an extension of the ADGB of the Weimar period, according to 
Childs, which had significant membership and was viewed as the premier trade union 
during that time.127 Fulbrook explains that this body encompassed the proletariat of East 
Germany, “which in the late 1980s boasted a membership of 9.6 million people—
virtually the entire adult population of the GDR.”128 This level of conformity did not 
exist anywhere else, whether it was the product of compulsion or true faith, the state had 
penetrated every level of society within the GDR. Grothe accurately observes in 1958 
that the intangibles of propaganda and how they needed translation into an achievable 
goal where “it is the FDGB, a tool of the government rather than a trade union 
representing the workers, that belabors this point.”129  
The duality of function existed in the FDGB where it acted as a political 
promulgator of propaganda and as a way to gather people together for political 
monitoring. The FDGB was a group where the worker’s active participation ended when 
exiting the factory. This was a group who required participation, or at least the perception 
of participation, outside of the work environment in the form of rallies and mandatory 
union meetings. The Party’s aim was to allow no free time for the West to entice the 
workers.  
                                                 
126 Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship, 61, 85, 131; Höfig, “‘Organized Cheerfulness,’” 46–47. 
127 Childs, The GDR, 8. 
128 Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship, 59. 
129 Grothe, To Win the Minds of Men, 55. 
 36 
3. The Youth Organizations 
The extracurricular activities for children also needed to be accounted for.130 
Outside of school, children have immense amounts of time for play and primarily social 
activities. The state created ways to occupy children’s time through participation in state 
sponsored activities such as the FDJ or the Young Pioneers, so less time could be taken 
up seeking or enjoying Western influences. Fulbrook claims that between two thirds and 
four fifths of the FDJ eligible age group participated in the group and further cites that 
“although membership was not compulsory, the penalties for conspicuous nonconformity 
were a consideration for those with serious career aspirations.”131  
Dennis points out that “the socialization of children and young people is not 
envisaged as the prerogative of parents but as a cooperative effort between parents, 
school and state organizations such as the Thälmann Pioneers and the Free German 
Youth.”132 Everything that children were involved in centered around the ideas of 
socialism and how to protect the state ideology and “material rewards in the form of 
scholarships and jobs [were] available in return for demonstrations of political loyalty, 
such as FDJ membership, even though much of this activity [was] frequently superficial 
and ritualistic.”133 Under Honecker’s organization of the FDJ in 1946, Fulbrook explains 
that “the FDJ played a major role in the political indoctrination of young people, in cadre 
selection and leadership training: it also sought to cater for the leisure interests of youth, 
and held overall responsibility for the organization for younger children,”134 Ernst 
Thälmann’s Young Pioneers. An additional feature to providing a platform for 
disseminating state propaganda, it also provided the ability to keep an eye out for 
possible dissent throughout a citizen’s life.135  
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Multiple avenues existed for the state to approach the East German youth. The 
indoctrination was as innocuous as simple songs and chants for little children to 
remember, as explained by Grothe where a six year old repeats the slogan: “Five fingers 
has the hand. The five-year plan brings freedom to the land.”136 Seemingly harmless, yet 
simple mantras that extolled the virtues of conformity and political loyalty were imported 
from the Soviet Union, notably “instructive tales of young children denouncing their 
parents for political disloyalty were the heritage of Soviet folklore taught in the USSR’s 
Young Pioneers and its DDR equivalent, the Ernst Thälmann Pioneers.”137 Children 
primarily exist within the social sphere of society, and for the GDR to usurp the privilege 
of raising the children from their parents nearly impossible to de-program in the few 
moments a day parents had with their children. Parents could only do so much, even if 
they dared to challenge the conventional propaganda of the state for fear of being turned 
over as subversive.138  
Dennis explains that “Honecker’s SED managed to keep the lid on the younger 
generation through a mixture of intensive political socialization, the dense network of 
FDJ … and other state organization.”139 The state sought to sanction the FDJ, and its 
ancillary branches of the Young Pioneers et al., as the only officially recognized youth 
organization within the GDR and fought unsuccessfully to outlaw other non-state 
institutional forms of socialization, such as the church. Fulbrook asserts that the “FDJ 
was there not only to socialize and educate the rising generation, but also to provide a 
training ground and selection stadium for future leadership positions.”140 It was an 
official incubator for the next cadre of officials within the GDR. Coopting the time of the 
adults and the children through carefully crafted state institutions was critical to the  
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success for the longevity of the regime. The state needed to address the status of the 
church, as one of the only holdovers from the old regime that remained, and its 
relationship with society.141  
E. THE CAREFUL BALANCE OF THE CHURCH 
Because the church existed as one of the few non-state institutions within the 
GDR, and possessed relative autonomy with ties to churches beyond the GDR’s borders 
(either with the Vatican or the Federal Republic’s protestant churches), it had the 
potential to provide significant problems while coexisting within framework of the SED’s 
communist ideology. The church presented a unique problem for the SED because of 
various barriers presented by the church, as well as barriers inherent in the communist 
party line. Robert Goeckel explains that “it is necessary to understand the structures and 
beliefs of both church and state that affect their respective self-definitions and their 
policies toward each other.”142 Even Grothe illustrates opposition between the two as 
noteworthy in 1958 when he explains, “communism is not only an opponent of 
Christianity, but it is a religious opponent,”143 which illustrated that the church provided 
a recognized barrier to the regime from the earliest periods.144  
It was a historical threat because, “as in West Germany, the churches were the 
only organization to survive Germany’s defeat without interruption,”145 according to 
Childs. The church provided a continuity dilemma, even in the wake of extensive 
denazification in almost every other sector that occurred, in the SED’s attempts to form a 
clean break with the past. This caused a push pull effect with periods of increasing and 
decreasing state sanctions and pressures placed on the church as the SED was 
determining the best tack to minimize subversive behavior. Overt tactics that were 
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employed by the SED to influence other sectors of society did not work with the 
church.146 For example, as a way to bridge the gap between the youth organizations into 
communist adulthood, the state introduced the Jugendweihe, “the state’s secular 
alternative to the Church’s confirmation ceremony.”147 The Jugendweihe served as way 
for those coming of age to profess to the community their commitment to socialist 
ideology.  
The SED could not simply replace the religiously trained leaders of the church; in 
the same way it could not replace doctors. Nor could the slow pace of time be used to 
change the church leadership with highly trained believers of SED ideology since the 
communist party line was inherently atheistic. True believers of communism and 
socialism would be unable to penetrate the church, an institution that required just as 
much ideological devotion. At best, they needed to cooperate with each other through 
mutual understanding of roles and responsibilities, and as Grothe explains prophetically 
in 1958, “if the communists are to change the consciousness of the East German people, 
they must reckon with the massive roadblock of Christianity.”148  
As a state sanctioned alternative, the Jugendweihe was a secular response to the 
church’s coming of age ceremony, which the church deemed the Jugendweihe 
“incompatible with Christian teachings,”149 and denounced it, since it stressed an 
atheistic world-view by those who participated. The church realized that the harsh stance 
against the secular ceremony, in an environment where non-conformity was met with 
increased scrutiny, was not worth pressing the issue, as explained by Fulbrook:  
The masses after all had to live in the real world, and to find their own 
forms of compromise with the prevailing political conditions; and a 
continued adamant stance on the part of the church leadership might 
ultimately have led to the Volkskirche finding itself without a Volk.150 
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The church would reach an agreement with the SED in 1978 and come to a relative truce. 
Goeckel exerts that this era would mark a time when the church viewed itself having 
latitude, “given increasing political dissent and disaffection, the church served as both an 
umbrella for the expression of oppositional views and a channel for and domesticator of 
such views.”151 This subtle change in the already contentious church state relationship 
provided leeway for one of the few state-allowed institutions a shielded avenue for a 
GDR citizen to express dissent and personal thoughts outside the sanctioned purview of 
the SED. This was one of the biggest fears of the SED, as explained by their turbulent 
relationship.152 
F. CONCLUSION 
The SED accurately identified critical centers of gravity that would hinder the 
conformity and homogenization of thought within the state. The creation of mass 
organizations for society to participate was critical to accomplishing this mission against 
the backdrop of war destruction and East German society’s desire for a return to 
normalcy. From a practical standpoint, the creation of these institutions served the 
purpose of binding the citizen closely with the state and streamlining the propaganda 
emanating from both Moscow and East Berlin. A precarious exception to these state 
created institutions would be the existence and continuity of the church with its ties 
extending beyond the borders of the GDR. The SED would have to create an institution 
loyal to the party, uniform in manner, and possess the capacity to monitor all aspects of 
GDR society. 
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IV. SHIELD AND SWORD OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
The Ministry of State Security (MfS or Stasi) represented itself as the shield and 
sword of the SED; in fact, it was the party-state’s ideological enforcer, with 100,000 full-
time personnel and more than twice as many “unofficial collaborators,” as informants 
were designated, engaged in the observation and repression of society by the 1980s. At 
one level, the East German Secret Police were no secret; every citizen of the GDR knew 
about the Stasi and assumed that its agents were everywhere. At another level, few 
realized until after the regime collapsed just how thoroughly the Stasi permeated all 
human relations in East Germany in the name of ensuring absolute ideological purity.153  
Founded in 1950—though with precedents in Germany and the Soviet Union that 
date back at least to the interwar period, the agency was headed for its first few years by 
Wilhelm Zaisser, a German communist who had previously held important if indistinct 
positions in the Soviet Union, including serving as a member of COMINTERN. Despite 
his excellent Moscow pedigree, Zaisser’s tenure at the helm of the Stasi did not survive 
the popular uprisings of 17 June 1953. In 1957, Erich Mielke, a KPD street brawler in 
interwar Berlin who had served as the deputy to both Zaisser and his immediate successor 
in 1953, took over the agency. Mielke kept this office until he was forced out and the 
Stasi wrapped up in November 1989.  
Mielke prided himself on being among the last true Stalinists who, like most of 
the East German leadership, had no use for faddish reforms, even when they came from 
Moscow. The Stasi never loosened its hold on East German State and society until both 
came apart. The former minister failed to grasp what had happened even then, 
proclaiming to the National Council a few days after his ouster, “I love all people” and 
insisting that he had done his work with the health and safety of the East German 
populace foremost in his mind.154  
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The East German epoch of internal state security was highly successful. During 
the Third Reich, the Gestapo was an intimidating arm of the National Socialist party, and 
the MVD, predecessor of the KGB, was a successful organization for political state 
security in the Soviet Union, so the natural logical conclusion is that the two entities were 
more or less smashed together to form a uniquely East German element. That is an 
oversimplification, and, as Schmeidel points out, “despite the deservedly ferocious 
reputation of the Geheime Staatspolizei, or Gestapo … the number of professional 
employees and the population proportion of the agent network enforcing order in Nazi 
Germany were rather modest.”155 To be sure, some blending between Gestapo and MVD 
tactics did exist, so the concept of their fusion maintains some relevance: 
When [the Gestapo] did sniff out treachery, the penalty was nearly always 
torture and death. After the mid-1960s, this was rarely the case with Stasi, 
unless the miscreant was a rogue MfS officer who fled. At the height of 
World War II, the Gestapo and SD combined had some 6,000 employees 
and no more than 70,000 informers in a nation of sixty-six million in the 
homeland German Reich. Its proportional coverage was less than one-
tenth that of the DDR, where the MfS counted 91,000 professional 
employees and some 174,000 informants for a population barely sixteen 
million in 1989.156 
As Dennis notes, from the very beginning, security concerns within the German 
party and the Soviet military government helped to create an East German state that was 
inseparable from its internal police functions.”157 The MfS became the SED’s 
psychological instrument of coercion, creating fear among citizens that every word, 
action, and even thought were up for interpretation by the state. Rather than Max Weber’s 
theory of the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force, the East German flavor of 
internal state security was disproportionately psychologically, rather than physically, 
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enforced. Sabrow asserts, “The GDR could never meet any of the requirements 
formulated by Max Weber in his ideal types of legitimate rule.”158  
This is not to say that the Stasi did not commit physical acts of coercion. In 
retrospect, the only way to hold a society who dissolved so quickly and nonviolently 
could be explained more parsimoniously through the psychological coercion being lifted 
from its citizens. The level of brutality waned as the informant system grew and 
gradually evolved into a system with a firm basis in psychological, rather than physical, 
coercion. Psychological coercion can occur as long as the chains of the psychological 
condition exist within the individual, and in the case of the GDR, were held together by 
the collective group. Once these chains were broken, nearly uniformly in the case of the 
GDR, the citizens were able to recognize the reality within the GDR. Sabrow explains 
that a previous Politburo member discussed “with some astonishment about the barriers 
in his head, and was unable to justify why it had never occurred to him before 1989, not 
even when he was in the West.”159 He even cites Mielke, the head of the MfS, who asked 
the question, “How could it happen that we simply gave up our GDR, just like that?”160 It 
was as if the hypnotic trance of East German socialism was broken and all barriers ceased 
to exist.161  
A. HOW DEEPLY DID THE STASI PENETRATE SOCIETY? 
The explanation of this hypnotic trance lies in the deep penetration of the state 
security apparatus. Penetration can mean many different things. Not only did the Stasi 
want to gain access to these institutions, it also sought to influence or outright control 
them from within. Dennis explains, “the Stasi was first and foremost the agent of the 
hegemonic SED and repeatedly and unhesitatingly endorsed the party’s leading role in 
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society, as enshrined in the GDR Constitution.”162 In order to combat subversion by the 
West, the Stasi was tasked with monitoring all aspects of life to ensure political 
uniformity and weed out any Western spies living among the population.  
The SED wanted true believers and protectors of the communist faith, which 
required careful vetting to avoid employing former Nazis. The Stasi, particularly after 
Mielke took over command, wanted to expand into every heart and every mind in the 
GDR. The SED preferred younger personnel to fill the ranks, those too young to have 
been politicized by the Nazis. The denazification of the political police yielded meager 
results initially but expanded the force “from 601 in 1949 to 19,803 by 1962.”163 
However, Childs and Popplewell explain that there was some inevitable overlap between 
the old Nazi regime and those available to serve the Party, for similar reasons as to the 
employment of the intelligentsia. The manpower simply was not available in eastern 
Germany’s demographic landscape. Those eager to join the Stasi, did it for various 
reasons, but more often than not, they joined the SED’s Stasi for an elevated status in the 
new country’s hierarchy.164  
The party-state could not employ all citizens within the Stasi, nor could the Stasi 
be effective if insufficiently staffed, so the system of becoming an informant began to 
evolve, which facilitated the shift from physical coercion to primarily psychological 
means. This was the most critical concept to the success of the Stasi in its efforts to 
penetrate everyday society. If a Stasi officer were unable to be present, then he would 
need to employ and deploy emissaries on his behalf to keep tabs on society. The idea of a 
secret informer had negative connotations, and the SED preferred ambiguity to obscure 
the true nature of its efforts. The term Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter (IM), translates to 
unofficial colleague, where “the deliberate blandness of the term IM obscures the reach 
and bite of a system of population surveillance without quantitative parallel in 
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documented history, equaled if at all, by the DDR’s stepmother, the Soviet Union,”165 
according to Schmeidel. Shifting from secret informant to IM minimized a contrast to the 
normal citizen, increased complicity with reduced stigmatization, and would aid in the 
efforts of societal penetration.166  
The Stasi’s delicate web of informants slowly grew throughout GDR history. As 
explained by Schmeidel, the 1968 Richtlinie “was an early hint of the ideal of 
flächendecke Überwachung, or ‘comprehensive surveillance.’”167 The IM field expanded 
into subspecialties that could more readily penetrate society based on qualifications that 
the Stasi field agent did not have, especially in the technical arena. Dennis explains the 
targets of the Stasi were the segment of the population that “deviated from the norm and 
made people susceptible to the influence of the enemy,”168 to which he further expounds: 
“Among the factors identified by the Stasi as conducive to such actions and attitudes 
were petty bourgeois egoism and careerism, anti-social or criminal behavior and 
grumbling.”169 Individual behavior was the target; however, a few groups within the 
GDR can almost always be stereotypically categorized as more belligerent than others by 
the very nature of the philosophy that bands these groups together. Dennis explains the 
goal of MfS operations: 
The MfS dictionary summarized the goal of operational decomposition as 
‘splitting up, paralyzing, disorganizing and isolating hostile-negative 
forces in order, through preventive action, to foil, considerably reduce or 
stop completely hostile-negative actions and their consequences or, in a 
varying degree, to win them back both politically and ideologically.170 
B. STASI IN THE ARTS 
Another persistent threat to society lay at the fringe elements of society and who 
fostered the type of freethinking prevalent in universities, a sector Fulbrook calls the 
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cultural intelligentsia. She explains that “autonomous artists, writers and thinkers who 
were not dependent on a regular income from some form of institutional employment, 
were far more problematic in many respects.”171 The level of economic coercion towards 
conformity did not exist within these circles. Many reports cite the ration of informants or 
collaborators with the Stasi was in the neighborhood of 1 for every 60 citizens, which 
ballooned to 1 for every 30 if all ancillary and previous informants were counted as 
having collaborated at one time or another. This was a staggering number of participants, 
willing or not, for a country of this size. She explains that the artists and writers were not 
always opposed to the state, but rather existed “with opinions ranging from the 
ultrasupportive to the utterly critical.”172  
In a society where conformity was expected, dissidence would not be tolerated. 
This prompted the Stasi to more aggressively penetrate these groups. Dennis illustrates 
the level of successful penetration, when he cites “for example, in 1989, 49 out of the 123 
members of the executive of the Writers’ Union had been or still were Stasi collaborators, 
and 12 out of the 19 members of the Presidium were former or current IMs.”173 The hope 
of temporal change of the political thoughts and complicity of the younger generation 
was the hope of the SED. Fulbrook’s statement regarding the complicity of the masses, 
and desire to conform over time:  
The capacity to conform, without enquiring too closely, the capacity to 
live within apparently immutable parameters, is less difficult to explain 
than emergence of a willingness to think differently, to have the courage 
of one’s convictions and accept the related risks and disadvantages, and to 
dare to mount an active challenge to the rules of the game.174 
The SED hoped that waiting out the dissidents would help facilitate the Stasi 
penetration of these portions of society; however, Fulbrook’s cultural intelligentsia 
historically existed in the parts of society that were critical to the functionality of a 
regimes and offered a counter-culture to the main stream. The Stasi hoped to ride out the 
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storm of social change that would inevitably root out Western influence, in its eyes. The 
cultural sectors were understood to be the incubators of national identity and the 
profession of the national myth through the use of socialist realistic techniques. The Stasi 
towed a fine line between promoting the cultural aspects of the GDR and not letting the 
message ruffle the ideology of the SED. This fine line is embodied in the use of artisan 
infiltrators by the Stasi to help craft a pro-GDR message. This feat would be perpetrated 
by Sascha Anderson, a poet who “by about the middle of the [1980s] had become one of 
the most influential figures among the writers and the artists in the Prenzlauer Berg 
area.”175 Dennis writes that his main goal was “the de-politicization of this artistic 
community.”176 An unintended consequence of this community’s use of socialist realism 
was the evolution of quiet dissent that they fostered and ultimately aided in the leitmotif 
of the GDR’s non-violent collapse. Anderson’s intent to reform from within never took 
hold as the temporal factor was removed when the GDR collapsed in 1989.177  
C. STASI IN THE WORKPLACE AND HIGHER EDUCATION 
The Stasi monitored political activity at all levels, and the most fundamental level 
for GDR communism to flourish was through the production centers. The Stasi was 
crucial to those production centers, especially “if the product was of considerable value in 
terms of hard currency exports and specialist knowledge… then the saturation with Stasi 
informers was likely to be particularly high.”178 The minor levels of production produced 
shallower penetration, unless the production center presented conditions that “were 
particularly dangerous…then the Stasi’s concern was less to address the root causes of 
preventable accidents and environmental pollution than to seek to ensure that knowledge 
of their effects did not become public.”179 Information control and being ahead of the 
message was a vital task to preserve the SED because, as Schmeidel illustrates, “the 
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regime was always conscious that although it had acquiescence, it had little popularity 
amongst its own people”180 and that “there was more to fear from the disaffection of its 
own populace than from the capitalist world.”181 The workforce understood which 
sectors of production were more important to the state and understood that the level of 
Stasi penetration into those areas would be higher. The network of informants grew like a 
cancer, percolating into every stratum within society. The priorities of invading the rest 
of society were similar to the production centers in that the certain societal sectors where 
a high potential for volatility existed, the Stasi increased its efforts.182  
The incentive for the Stasi to monitor the higher educational echelons was also 
vital. As the GDR was coalescing into a functioning state, according to Schmeidel, “the 
SED turned its attention quickly to the universities, which in their eyes were of 
potentially huge value in forming the younger leadership cadre of communist 
Germany.”183 The problem with high educations was that it required a degree of latitude 
to operate competently within their profession within the international community, 
whereas the lower education within the GDR was focused domestically. Fulbrook 
illustrates the point that “university teachers wanted to be able to confer with colleagues 
across borders, on the grounds that ‘science knows no [geographical] boundaries.’”184 
According to Schmeidel, the leadership felt “the universities were far too focused upon 
humanistic research for the Party’s taste,”185 and prompted reforms in these areas starting 
in 1951. The higher education volatility was not a sector of society that would eventually 
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of the highly technical professions, because of the very tenants of what higher education 
entailed. People who were educated at the higher levels would be a persistent threat 
throughout the existence of the GDR.186 
D. PENETRATION OF THE CHURCH? 
The Stasi was able to successfully pierce the church structure, but eventually it 
could not stop the undercurrent of people championing moralistic issues. Fulbrook 
explains that while the Stasi infiltration had nearly uniform results in the level of 
coopting other sectors of society, “there was great variability from area to area, parish to 
parish, within any of the regional churches, depending on the views and personalities of 
particular pastors and their support or otherwise from regional leaders.”187 Dennis 
explains, “in retrospect, it is clear that the Stasi enjoyed considerable success in 
influencing church policy and in curtailing critical potential.”188 Fulbrook counters that 
this was only one of a two-pronged policy toward the church, where the SED sought 
“both to undermine Christianity as a living force in society while at the same time 
attempting to infiltrate and increasingly control the leadership of the church.”189 This was 
a problem in that the human rights, health, and welfare systems were poor in the GDR, 
and the church was not afraid to provide open critical analysis. The church throughout its 
history championed all of these issues, so those informants that were able to successfully 
infiltrate the church were split between two ideological worlds. Dennis illustrates the 
problems with these overlapping spheres of communism and Christianity into a bizarre 
rationalization of their reality. 
A kind of dual loyalty, which is not easily classified into dichotomies of 
collaboration and refusal, resistance and accommodation, and which was 
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Protestantism, a utopian belief in a humane socialism as the preferred third 
way between capitalism and communism, and a pragmatic perception of 
the GDR’s capacity for survival.190 
The moral issues that the church sought to eradicate and castigate the regime for, created 
quite a few peace groups that pushed for such causes as increased environmentalism, a 
nuclear free world, and human rights. Although successful penetration by the Stasi 
occurred, its effectiveness can be seen as non-existent because as Childs and Popplewell 
explain, “all these church and peace group activities over the 1980s were to culminate as 
a vital part of the peaceful revolution in 1989.”191 Ultimately, the church lived up to its 
end of the bargain providing an adequate umbrella for the free flow of ideas and a conduit 
with the West. 192  
E. CONCLUSION 
The regime that the SED cultivated over time did its best through the design of a 
system that exerted total control over its people and territory, albeit for a short period of 
history. The only way for this system to have been successful for so long is through 
careful design. The first step that the SED took was what any responsible government 
would have done in the wake of the Second World war by creating a legitimate working 
state to alleviate the suffering through the lack of critical infrastructure that was 
destroyed during the war. This perceived legitimacy allowed the SED room to exploit the 
Germans in the Soviet Zone and graft communist ideals onto an already existing, newly 
functioning skeletal structure. Once this structure was functioning on the most basic 
level, the meat could be filled onto this skeletal structure with a communist overtone and 
inculcation of the communist ideal. As the party was finding its way in the post war 
landscape, it overcame the obstacles of how to increase production through the 
employment of women and take charge of the upbringing of the children whose mothers 
needed to work. This divide and conquer attitude lasted until the end of the GDR when 
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the delicately laced web of communism was subverted through the interconnected 
movements that spontaneously arose and broke the psychological bonds that held the 
citizens in their place. The Stasi was the shield and sword of the SED until the end and 
infiltrated, physically and psychologically, every sector of society. Although its 
infiltration of the church was a successful endeavor, if physical infiltration was the 
metric, it could not account for the inability to psychologically penetrate the church’s 
moral belief in human rights. The church’s friction with the SED lay within the 
humanitarian realm and it did not disagree with communism as a form of government, as 
is traditionally thought. The Stasi’s psychological hold on society would come to an end 

















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 53 
V. SCHOOL OF THE NATION WITH COMPASS AND HAMMER 
VOLKSARMEE AS THE BASIS OF AN EAST GERMAN 
NATIONAL IDENTITY 
The creation of the legend of a uniquely East German socialist nation of workers 
and peasants posed a difficult task for the SED to embark on, not the least because this 
effort arose out of the ruins of the myths and legends of the Third Reich and the Nazi 
people’s community. After the Second World War, the GDR was an island nation, cut off 
from its ethnic brothers and sisters of the new Federal Republic and beyond, and thrust by 
fate and geopolitics to the forefront of the Cold War. By 1955, this friction placed the 
GDR as the battleground of tension between the Warsaw Pact and NATO along the 
Soviet Zone’s border with the West.  
The SED understood the strength of German nationalism and attempted to 
cultivate the concept of a distinctively East German nation once the threat of 
reunification was minimized with its West German kin in the middle and late 1950s and 
really once the wall was built in 1961. An effective method among European nations for 
the cultivation of a national identity was through the state’s military apparatus of the 
socialist type. This school of the nation in the form of the army is observed throughout 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century France, Britain, and Germany.  
Although the SED recognized the importance of a national mythology as seen 
through Marxist Leninist eyes, the GDR’s inability to cultivate the national myth through 
the use of the NVA was a major failure when seen by the light of events in 1989–1990. In 
the end, the overextension of the SED’s aims for nation building of the socialist type and 
on the model of the Red Army through military training and education, nonetheless, in 
the final chapter of the life of the GDR, allowed for a significant peace movement to 
propagate throughout the GDR. The peace movement within the GDR in the 1970s and 
the 1980s was the culmination of a multitude of factors and stands as a significant pillar 
in the domestic triggers for the dissolution of the East German state and a forceful 
rejection of the pervasive militarism of the socialist model in the Warsaw Pact that was 
especially onerous in eastern Germany.  
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A. THE MILITARY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CULTURAL 
DISSEMINATION 
Europe set a precedent by administering national identity through the use of the 
nation-state’s military apparatus. The modern army and the new nation state were twins, 
and this duality only became more intense in the twentieth century and the age of total 
war from 1914 until 1945 and beyond. In order to show that fostering a national identity 
through military means is not unique to the hyper-nationalism fostered solely within 
Imperial Germany or the Third Reich, the case in France and Britain will be dissected to 
illustrate that it also occurred beyond German borders in this question of the modern 
nation state and the school of the army as a means to forge the citizen. The establishment 
of the nation-state in Europe since the eighteenth century, with the idea of a political, 
cultural and psychological connection between citizens, occurred with varying degrees of 
success throughout the European continent.  
1. France 
A successful European example of the state’s use of the military to socialize its 
citizens is embodied in France’s national identity building from the revolution until the 
end of the First World War. Eugene Weber explains how “schooling taught hitherto 
indifferent millions the language of the dominant culture, and its values as well, among 
them patriotism.”193 He positions the military as the graduate level of culture 
dissemination especially in the Third Republic (1871–1940) when he says, “military 
service drove these lessons home.”194 To achieve such a high level of shared identity, the 
French needed to overcome many problems when assimilating and socializing France’s 
peasants. In the earliest days, the peasants viewed the military as an occupying force, 
rather than an extension of the people, showing a civil military divide.  
Much of this mentality lay in the Frenchman’s psychological separation between 
the government and the people where “military service is looked on as a tax exacted by 
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the state, a sort of theft.”195 Labor was extracted from the production centers and put to 
work for the state. The motives were not readily identifiable as a struggle that the 
everyday citizen should be concerned with. As the French army was reorganized to 
reward hard work, literacy, and competency, “the army turned out to be an agency for 
emigration, acculturation, and in the final analysis, civilization, an agency as potent in its 
way as the schools,”196 according to Weber.  
Much of this unifying force is attributed to the socialization of the peasantry in 
France within the military. Peasants were able to socialize with the middle and upper 
class through shared language, culture, identity, and experiences. These would help break 
down the system, in the epoch of Tocqueville’s Ancien Regime, between the landed elites 
defined by the estates into the class system that provided some level of social mobility 
when compared to the estate system. This allowed a bond to form between subjects of 
France where they now viewed themselves as Frenchmen, deriving from the same 
national origin, sharing the same lineage, and extolling the virtues of the French 
nation.197  
2. Britain 
Britain was also able to mobilize its citizens as Britons using the military as a 
shared identity in the epoch from the eighteenth century until the twentieth century; 
however, the winds of change regarding the break down from estates to class were 
foreshadowed in the struggle between the landed elite and Britain’s merchants in the 
eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. The tradesmen in Britain were not happy with 
their lack of participation in state affairs and sought to reform the system where their 
involvement was necessary and warranted. Colley points out that “it is the relationship 
between land and trade that is the important issue.”198 Trade was able to instill a form of 
patriotism within the merchants because it brought significant profit to them and provided 
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the merchants a growing voice in their interactions with the state. After all, it was trade 
through which the state was also gaining its power and wealth.  
As the fear of French power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was 
growing, the question of mass mobilization was raised. The British had to identify the 
underlying problems presented in “how were large numbers of men living on the edge of 
poverty to be brought to risk life and limb for a nation in which active citizenship was 
denied them?”199 As the middle class was exerting its influence within the state through 
trade, the state had to figure out how to instill in the lower class a sense of citizenship. 
Initially, the ability to volunteer in the British military required substantial financial 
backing. Colley suggests that the demographics surrounding the volunteer force as 
primarily middle class in the Napoleonic period, “volunteering…was primarily, though 
not exclusively, a prosperous man’s game.”200  
The tide would soon turn and necessity would dictate a different approach. Colley 
illustrates that “the British government had been compelled to call for the support of all 
Britons—not just Englishmen, or Anglicans, or the propertied, or men of conservative 
views, but Britons in general.”201 She continues to explain that if Britain mobilized all of 
her subjects in the face of the French threat in the Napoleonic wars, and instilled them 
with patriotism, a risk existed as to the political influence this new class of citizen would 
want to exert in Britain’s future. The socialization of all Britain’s social classes, in order 
“to beat the French, the British had been required to imitate the French, and the challenge 
this presented to its old order was potentially corrosive.”202 The British created a 
contrastable duo and could immediately point to her continental foe as a threat to her 
nation. Through patriotism instilled within her subjects, where the military represented a 
way to display the highest form of loyalty to the nation, Britain would erode the system 
of estates, ruled by the landed elite, into a system of class.203  
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3. German Nationalism 
The breakdown of estates into a system of class in the modern epoch in Western 
Europe was essential in the French and British experience. Germany was not immune to 
this wave of nationalism and self-determination sweeping Europe. The mechanics of 
nationalism in Germany was an understood phenomenon, however, the revolutionary 
potential was not recognized. Peter Fritzsche, in his analysis of National Socialism from 
1914 until 1933, explains that although the differences between Germany’s cultural 
sectors existed throughout its history, “in the first years of the twentieth century people in 
Germany became more and more alike, sharing an incipient consumer culture and poring 
over the same images in the national press.”204 He continues to explain how “World War 
I transformed German nationalism by giving it emotional depth and tying it to social 
reform and political entitlement.”205  
The German sentiment during the War period was a sense of national pride rather 
than the previous feelings of going to war for the state or the empire. Germans were 
going to war and supporting their German brothers and sisters for Germany, not 
Hohenzollern. The Kaiser’s empire became increasingly unstable and the elites became 
progressively disconnected with society. The German middle class began to exert 
political acumen. As the military forces began to see themselves as part of society, rather 
than aligned with the Emperor, the ability to squash the uprisings diminished, ever more 
isolating Wilhelm. Increased disconnectedness aided in the demise of the German Empire 
through the political rise of the middle class, but the nation’s erosion of the Junkers’ 
influence would not be complete until the Third Reich.206  
The Nazis harnessed the desires of the population during the desperate situation of 
the interwar period, rekindling German nationalism of mass and highly vicious kind. 
Fritzsche explains that the election of Hindenburg in 1925 was the result of the elevation 
of integral nationalism within Germany’s interwar period. The Nazis fueled nationalism 
                                                 
204 Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 27. 
205 Ibid., 28. 
206 Gordon Alexander Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1964), 346; Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis, 27–28. 
 58 
through a platform of “national solidarity, economic productivity, and imperial 
aspirations”207 and that these platforms would lead to German prosperity. Frizsche posits 
that “better than any other party, the Nazis were able to insert the desire for social reform 
into a national frame.”208 Although the transition was not unanimous, and the party had 
many critics, the magnetism of a united German nation was powerful in the organization 
of mass politics.  
The Nazis accurately read the desires of the nation and weaponized them. An 
important aspect of fostering a national identity is through the identification of someone 
who is not part of that nation, an enemy. According to Fritzsche, “even as the Nazis 
upheld an integral, almost redemptive nationalism, they created new categories of 
outsiders, enemies, and victims,”209 all key ingredients when defining a nation.210  
B. PRUSSIAN MILITARY LEGACY AND NATIONALISM 
The German military brought many of its traditions and its importance in civil-
military relations from the Prussian model forged from the 18
th
 century through the 20
th
 
century. Throughout German history, the separation of the soldier from mass politics and 
democracy as well as nationalism was increasingly difficult as the soldier was 
increasingly elevated to embody and symbolize the German Reich as a nation state. The 
historical significance of Gneisenau and Scharnhorst cannot be overstated as figures who 
led the way from the army of the estates to the army of a German nation led by Prussia. 
Their legacy would be integral to the military’s mindset to reorganize Germany after the 
Hindenburg’s declaration in 1919 of a “stab in the back” that followed the surrender and 
the dissolution of the monarchy in November 1918.  
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Hitler played on the military’s dislocation with society in the interwar years with 
promises to restore it to its rightful place as the cornerstone of German state and nation as 
well as society. Gordon Craig illustrates the mindset of the German army through a 
military journal published in 1934: 
In the new state of Adolf Hitler, the Wehrmacht is no foreign body as it 
was after the November revolt of 1918. Today it is a part of the organic 
community and shares in the common distribution of the nation’s work; 
and it follows Adolf Hitler as the Fuehrer of the people with full 
confidence and with devotion to its great national task.211 
Hitler elevated the soldier as a mainstay of his integral nationalism within German 
culture, reaching a zenith of civil military fusion. The nationalism felt by German citizens 
was strong throughout the Second World War and provided momentum for Hitler’s 
ambitions.  
At the same time, Hitler gained further control of the army in 1934, in 1938, in 
1942 and finally in 1944, and eventually society, through his purges leading up to the 
war, creating a cult of Fuehrer personality. The General Staff that Hitler had reorganized 
would not dare to cross his thought process for fear of retribution, thereby making the 
military complicit through its inaction.  
Hitler’s officer corps, according to Megargee, became increasingly polarized 
between the junior officers, who were true believers in Nazism, and the senior officers 
who wanted to adhere to their Prussian ideals of the state and apolitics, but who were 
trapped and often themselves little more than criminals in certain cases. The increase in 
Nazi believers in the ranks more closely amalgamated the officer corps with the state, 
which caused a divergence from its nation. This would increase the chasm between the 
German citizens and the military that would have significant effects in post war German 
military rearmament, for both the East and West.212  
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C. GDR’S NATIONAL GENESIS 
The SED had to create a unique identity between itself and its West German 
counterparts, in lieu of a pan-German identity, because of the artificiality of the new bloc 
borders between the Eastern and Western sectors astride the riven world system of states. 
The SED and Stalin hoped that this sense of national identity, closely aligned with Soviet 
beliefs, would spread throughout Germany if it were to become a unified state. In lieu of 
a united Germany, the SED decided to cultivate a secular religion based on a Marxist-
Leninist struggle that was unique to eastern Germany and to the story of class struggle as 
seen in the fate of workers and peasants in a Leninist manner. The SED understood the 
importance of education as a vehicle through which this identity could be fostered. 
France and Britain suffered through a language divide and a rush for urbanization, 
barriers that the GDR did not have to overcome.  
The GDR was born out of a highly advanced society who possessed a 
comprehension of the German language; however, the ideological framework was 
retooled to propagate the new East German myth. One glaring physical problem for the 
GDR was the reality that many East Germans’ family members lived in a completely 
different Germany, the Federal Republic, whose familial ties could not be ignored by the 
GDR, especially as the West German state solidified and prospered in the 1950s and 
1960s. Germans had been exposed to nationalistic ideas unifying a German nation by 
highlighting their struggle until the fall of the Third Reich, and now an artificial border 
divided the nation into two states.  
This psychological unity that occurred prior to German division, proved to be a 
powerful force for both Germanys to combat. The GDR’s leadership grappled with the 
ability for its population to vote with its feet through inclusive rhetoric until 1961 when 
the Berlin Wall was built, restricting movement of its citizens. At this point the SED’s 
stance against the West took a much more hard lined approach and allowed for stricter 
implementation of the ideological foundation of East German communism. The East 
German military was directly affected by this change.213  
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D. THE GDR’S ATTEMPTED MILITARY FUSION WITH SOCIETY 
From an economic and security standpoint, the GDR did not need its own 
indigenous military force because the Soviets were supplying the requisite amount of 
manpower to facilitate security. The Soviets had immediately created a Stalinist 
paramilitary police force (KVP) with the occupation, which drew from refugees, as well 
as ex-military eager to serve the Soviet occupier. David Childs explains that creating an 
East German military force would fulfill multiple objectives. With Stalin’s original 
objective of a neutral Germany, “the integration of former KVP members into all-
German forces would ensure the Soviet Union a certain influence.”214 Childs also asserts 
that with the large number of Wehrmacht soldiers demobilized, this policy would employ 
a cross section of the population and keep them in the GDR, rather than provide them a 
reason to flee the GDR to join the FRG’s fledging Western oriented military. Lastly, he 
explains that “armed forces are one of the attributes of sovereignty”215 and that the SED 
needed this institution to secure domestic and international legitimacy. The reality was 
that the Soviets would maintain forces in the GDR throughout its history, but the newly 
formed military would have a German façade making Soviet expansion seemingly less 
threatening to Western anti-Soviet policy.216  
A divided Germany presented an identity crisis for the armed forces of both 
Germanies. Both countries championed a narrative that posited only one side as the 
legitimate heir to the positive aspects of German military history, and the other German 
military was a bizarre bastard child born out of evil ideology. SED leadership propagated 
the NVA as the legitimate evolutionary step in German civil-military progression, 
presenting the Bundeswehr as an extension of class oppression, consisting of imperialist 
warriors of the West.  
The NVA viewed itself as the ultimate amalgam of soldier, citizen, and state; 
however, the insulated view the NVA had of itself was a top down view shared by the 
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Party. The SED felt the fusion of citizen and soldier was at its zenith, but the general 
population did not share the same enthusiasm for the East German military man, as the 
soldier and the SED would continually be viewed as one in the same, yet different from 
the people. This phenomenon was not unique to the GDR, as the FRG was also faced 
with the task of selling the rearmament of Germans to its constituents, who increasingly 
displayed anti-military sentiments bordering on pacifism.217  
From the beginning of the GDR, the SED sought to fuse through indoctrination all 
elements of society with party politics and Marxist-Leninist beliefs. Using the Leninist 
and Trotskyite model of total control, military methods of education were easy for the 
party to implement because the population was small and the dissemination of uniform 
curricula was easier in a Stalinist totalitarian state to which was added a combination of 
Prussian and Saxon energies of a notable kind. In addition to these two advantages, 
German society psychologically yearned for organization at almost every level in the 
wake of wartime and in the needs of reconstruction.  
The party had done so much to get the state back into working order in the 
rebuilding of the war; the institution of an aggressive education curriculum was not such 
a large step in this phase. Roger Woods explains, through the use of transcripts in 1984 
on the peace movement in the GDR, “the population is to be disciplined by attempting to 
extend military forms of organisation to every aspect of life (education of children, 
vocational training, civil defense exercises for working people).”218 The population 
viewed this as progress in the recreation of the state.  
Fusion of the military was also in line with the thinking of Margot Honecker, the 
GDR’s Minister of Education. Jeanette Madarász explains that Frau Honecker “ordered 
that support for the politics of the SED should become the primary aim of every single 
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school lesson and educational work.”219 The military’s fusion with society provided a 
unique opportunity for the population’s ability to participate in extracurricular activities. 
Such institutions as the Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik (GST), a successor to the 
Hitler Youth and the National Socialist Motor Corps, Childs explains that the youth 
possessed few outlets for entertainment and “the GST seemed to offer all kinds of 
exciting things to do like parachute jumping, gliding, motor cycling, rifle and pistol 
shooting, learning to use radio equipment, and so forth.”220 The GST, Sport and 
Technology Association, was based on the Soviet model of pre-military education for the 
nation’s youth as well as its Nazi antecedents.  
In addition to the technical aspects of the militarization of society was the 
physical militarization of society through state sponsored sports clubs that also followed 
in the path of Nazi institutions of physical culture on a mass scale. The GST and DTSB, 
German Gymnastics and Sports’ Federation, were feeder programs for the NVA and 
aided in the militarization of society by providing the few mass organizations, sponsored 
by the SED, for youth to participate in. The GST offered skills that the population could 
use for military service and the DTSB put athletes into uniform. These athletes were part 
of the military, and they were of a professional nature where sport was their state 
sponsored job, as compared to the West’s amateur sports programs. The athletes provided 
propaganda for the SED to exploit in extolling the virtues of communism to the world, 
and it also helped facilitate a sense of national pride when the nation saw East Germans 
achieve Olympic or international success. This euphoria had a short shelf life in the 
everyday drudgery that the GDR citizens experienced.221 
E. NVA’S CIVIL-MILITARY DIVIDE 
By the 1980s, however, the SED’s fusion of the military and society divided the 
population rather than uniting it. Placing the Party at the center of life in the GDR 
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became dangerous and the militarization of society evoked historical memories of the 
Third Reich’s Volkssturm.222 The waning days of the Second World War saw the 
mobilization of all people within Germany, at the behest of the Nazi Party as the last gasp 
of resistance and slaughter in the final months of the war. Aligning all of the GDR’s 
citizens with the Party was the SED’s ultimate goal; however, the SED missed the 
psychological toll that the Volkssturm evoked in society. The SED’s heavy-handed 
measures failed to create an organic sense of national pride because it was generated from 
above rather than below. Only a few could receive some of the benefits through 
organizations that were tied to the NVA, such as the GST’s athletic initiatives, but by and 
large, the GDR’s youth felt the rest of military service was a way for the state to steal 
time.  
Many viewed the GDR’s military service as a form of extracting labor from the 
community and something that young people had to get through. Fulbrook illustrates 
these sentiments of extracted labor, the same that were observed in France, when she 
explains, “the vast majority of young East German males did in the end perform their 
military service…many simply conformed and then got on with ‘normal’ civilian life.”223 
She does concede that few exercised their option for a career within the Army and others 
joined their workplace paramilitary organizations, but this did little to foster a sense of 
national pride for serving the East German nation.224  
In addition to conscription and the temporary service required of the majority of 
the population, the career military men were increasingly isolated from their 
subordinates, and therefore society, because of increased SED indoctrination and 
monitoring. Nearly all of the military’s training originated from Moscow, either in 
practice or ideology. The GDR’s military was a replica of the Soviet military in heart and 
soul, but with a German face, consisting of a dual allegiance of the military to a military 
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chain of command as well as a political chain of command.225 Although the military 
officers required a high degree of technical qualification, this professional ideal was “in 
addition to sustaining total party discipline and ideological conformity.”226 Where the 
conscript was more closely aligned with societal norms, displayed by the population’s 
lack of enthusiasm for military service, the higher-ranking military officials were 
clutched to the bosom of the SED and insulated them from sharing a common identity 
with the average East German citizen through an elaborate system of institutions as well 
as the garrisons.  
According to Ken Kilimnik, “formal membership in the SED was nearly universal 
for officers and common for NCOs. An officer who was not a candidate to join the party 
had to attend ideology classes nearly every night.”227 By the final years of the regime, the 
average population’s growing distaste for the state’s invasiveness into everyday lives was 
something that the SED party members did not share in practice as they had become 
insulated in their state within a state. They became divided between the disillusioned 
masses who failed to see the fruits of communism coming to bear and those in the 
relatively large officer corps who were true believers, even with the notable evidence of 
the GDR’s decline in the 1980s. SED army political administration officers were 
assigned to almost every unit. The Stasi also assigned personnel to the military unit 
(Verwaltung 2000), which the local military commander had no control over.  
There existed no unity of command, neither in the Western sense, nor in the sense 
of military tradition in Prussia-Germany before 1945, nor in the Bundeswehr. That nature 
of military life and required membership within the party, military members were under 
increased state scrutiny. For the conscripts, the exposure to state scrutiny was temporary, 
but for the careerist it was enduring, causing the common belief that the upper military 
strata were either true believers of socialism or masochists.228  
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F. FRG AND GDR MILITARY NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS, 
DIFFERENT OR SIMILAR?  
The FRG and GDR approached the propagation of a national consciousness 
through their military apparatus from different angles, but the end result in generating a 
national consciousness were not similar, though certain less informed observers might 
detect a superficial likeness. The FRG and the GDR established their militaries in the 
1950s with a similar national narrative prior to division. Each country entered a period of 
reform, to which the opposing Germany objected to its value and purpose, and created its 
own version of the citizen soldier. The FRG held the values of human, citizen, and then 
soldier as the hierarchy through which its military must be viewed. The soldier was to be 
a thinking and feeling individual, rather than an robot. The new FRG military would 
primarily fulfill a functional role rather than exist an aesthetic extension of the state, as 
had been Germany and Prussia’s legacy. In the GDR, the SED felt that military service 
was on an ideological high ground as the most advanced evolutionary step where the 
peasant and worker doubled as the citizen and soldier.229  
As both German governments were rearming in the spirit of their new ideological 
mandate, popular resistance was strong on both sides of the inner German border because 
of the lost war and pacifism. The FRG began compulsory national service in 1956 after 
the entry into NATO, also an unpopular decision, but one that eventually took hold. East 
Germany could not institute mandatory service until 1962, after the wall was built, 
fearing population flight. The demographic that resisted conscription and military service 
the most was the youth in both countries. The memories of the Volkssturm and the 
militarization of society were not well received as each country rebuilt their military. The 
East German methodology was to militarize all aspects of society to meet the needs of 
party ideology. Dennis explains the GDR’s approach to instilling a national identity: 
The militarization of life in the GDR manifests itself in propaganda 
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mobilization of women, the frequent use of military symbols and 
traditions and the high level of participation in military and paramilitary 
organizations.230  
The West German case was less total, less militaristic, and embraced the ideal of 
the citizen in uniform in its NATO and FRG version, which was also a more successful 
ideal than that of the army of the socialist type in the 1960s and 1970s GDR. The citizen 
in uniform and the integration of the soldier into pluralism on the basis of the German 
Basic Law became known in the 1950s as Innere Führung, which was highly anti-
communist, prone to controversy as a continuation of bad things from the past, but, which 
nonetheless, worked out far better than its East German counter ideal of soldierly merit. 
Innere Führung extolled the values of a democratic society making clear the civilian 
government’s control of the military in the case of the FRG. The NVA pledged its 
allegiance to socialism as an ideology, leaving the military to be an instrument of the 
Party, and not the people.  
Gose’s dissertation leads to the conclusion that the psychology of a divided 
Germany was difficult for both countries to overcome. The question that both German 
governments would have to confront if a military conflict between Eastern and Western 
ideologies erupted was how could they convince Germans to shoot Germans? This is a 
good question, but they would have shot each other, especially in the depths of the Cold 
War, as Germans had slaughtered each other in the pre-national past with great glee.231  
The conditions between the two militaries were quite different as regards society, 
constitutions, and the alliance system. The Western-style military system, although 
dominated by conscription in the FRG, still generated a similar longing for Western 
standards in the East. This contrast between the GDR’s and FRG’s militaries fueled 
resentment within the NVA as an institution because NVA’s standard of existence was so 
much lower than the West. Kilimnik outlines the NVA’s conditions: 
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Well equipped for attack, the NVA was indifferent to the soldiers’ living 
conditions. The NVA stored tanks in heated buildings but housed soldiers 
in unheated barracks. The NVA permitted showers only once or twice a 
week and then always in large groups. Soldiers’ kitchens and lavoratories 
were caked with grime and grease; only command officers had access to 
separate dining rooms (with tablecloths) and private toilets.232 
This illustrates both the divide between the upper strata of military officers and 
the conditions under which normal conscripts lived. This state of affairs is a microcosm 
of the divide between the SED party members and the normal citizens; however, the 
difference was the divide within the army was visible to every day citizens, whereas the 
SED’s was not. In addition to poor conditions, if an FRG soldier wished to express 
dissent, he or she is allowed to petition his ombudsman to mediate on his behalf for any 
grievance.  
Dissent in the NVA was handled directly by the immediate chain of command, 
which could be a dangerous proposition considering the GDR’s aversion to any form of 
dissent. Kilimnik makes the assertion that “indoctrination without the freedom to dissent 
tends to produce the opposite view, however passive, among many”233 by citing a decline 
in the belief of the SED’s indoctrination of hatred toward the West. Much in the same 
way that the general population’s dissent was stifled, the military was no better and 
allowed the disdain for the SED to acutely fester in its conscripts.234  
G. CHURCH AND MILITARIZATION 
The introduction of defense education in September of 1978 would have 
reverberating effects throughout the GDR that would bring to a boiling point the 
population’s frustration and thrust a large peace movement within East Germany onto a 
global stage. Although defense education was not new to the GDR, the feature of making 
it mandatory was what caused friction. This negated any ability to dissent to military 
education through lack of participation, other than the minimum required to avoid  
 
                                                 
232 Kilimnik, “Germany’s Army after Reunification,” 118. 
233 Ibid., 123. 
234 Childs, The GDR, 271–293; Kilimnik, “Germany’s Army After Reunification,” 113–148. 
 69 
exposure to state scrutiny, or to opt out of combat duty and participate in building 
battalions, if the state accepted their application to this non-combat form of military 
participation. Bruce Allen asserts: 
The single most important stimulus for the emergence of the autonomous 
peace movement in the DDR as the most significant manifestation of 
social resistance there since June 1953 and the most durable to date, was 
the introduction of Defence Studies in the schools by the DDR’s 
Education Minister Margot Honecker in 1978.235 
This development sparked widespread condemnation from the Church, who 
opposed conscription as non-Christian and who campaigned on behalf of the peoples’ 
right to choose non-military service. The SED may have been attempting to circumvent 
practical problems that faced the state. Childs makes the assumption that this was 
because, in comparison to the other Warsaw Pact nations, that the GDR “has a shortage 
of labour and has, therefore, to husband its manpower more than most other states,”236 so 
by introducing military education earlier, the GDR could shorten the time a conscript 
spent away from a production job later.  
Another possible and politically motivated reason could stem from Willy Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik and period of détente with the GDR. Additionally, the state was experiencing a 
rise in youth related crime, according to Childs; so increased discipline would result in a 
better behaved society. All of these justifications for making military education 
mandatory have their counterarguments as to why this would not work, which is why the 
eruption of dissent over this issue was so strong.237  
The church’s condemnation of the policy for increased military education had 
little effect on the state’s decision to implement the policy; however, the alternative peace 
education program that the church promoted cracked the door for the GDR’s peace 
movement. In addition to the domestic concerns within the GDR, a potentially “New 
Cold War” was developing with the deployment of nuclear missiles. The Soviets had also 
invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and the GDR had increased civil defense drills, which 
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promoted a war like posture. Allen explains that in opposition to both East’s and West’s 
increased military posture, “the West European peace movement began its meteoric rise, 
making a strong impression on many East Germans, especially the young.”238 The 
GDR’s youth knew they were not alone in their fears and could psychologically align 
themselves with the peace movement. The Church’s lines of communication with 
parishes outside of the GDR allowed for a dissenting opinion to establish itself within the 
GDR since no citizen had a legitimate conduit to Western media. They would soon join 
the Church’s growing cries for peace within East Germany itself.239  
H. CONCLUSION 
The use of the military as a powerful vehicle to foster national identity in Europe 
was a formula in which the GDR’s leadership saw utility. The French, the British, and 
even historical German identity had been forged through this instrument. In addition to 
providing a German face to the Soviet Zone’s political leadership, the NVA was 
implemented to provide the façade of sovereignty and legitimacy; however, Soviet 
military was always the true source of military strength for the GDR. Unfortunately, the 
German nation was not as fractured as the SED had originally thought and although the 
creation of a national identity was a top priority for SED leadership, the policy failed in 
uniting a distinct East German population. In addition to the obstacle of a shared national 
identity with its sister state, the historical legacy of a highly militarized Nazi Germany 
weighed heavily on the population, leading to significant resistance to further 
militarization. The harder the SED pushed for integration of the military into everyday 
life, the greater the civil military divide became. Conscription and militarization of 
society kept the general population divorced from their career military counterparts, who 
were seen as nothing more than an extension of the party. As the threat of détente with 
the West loomed, the negative rhetoric towards Western ideals increased. The Defense 
Education reform in 1978 triggered Church intervention and the private dissent within  
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GDR citizens to emerge publicly throughout the 1980s in parallel with a pan-European 
movement of peace. The momentum behind this movement would help topple the regime 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The historical understanding of the devastation visited on the German population 
during the Second World War as a formative event in shaping the post war political 
landscape, exploited by both Eastern and Western forces, explains the psychological 
construct of its citizens. The Soviet Union used the German faces of Ulbricht, 
Ackermann, and Sobottka, along with their rigid communist—indeed, Stalinist—
ideology, to advance Soviet interests in the SBZ and to legitimize communism in East 
Germany amid the anti-Soviet views of the German nation in 1945. These Germans were 
devout communists who survived Stalin’s purges, bringing a pious line of Marxism-
Leninism that defined the GDR and its relationship with the Soviet Union throughout its 
existence. The Socialist Unity Party created a party state, leveraging its Soviet 
connection, and consolidated the power of all anti-fascist parties within the SBZ. Then, 
the SED executed its mandate to align society with its values.  
Although the western Allies’ approach in West Germany started and ended very 
differently, the effect—of instilling German society with a new set of values and political 
practices—is comparably thoroughgoing. It also resonates today with successive U.S. 
nation-building campaigns. The backing of Conrad Adenauer as the indigenous face 
representing the interests of his people in the Federal Republic of Germany was a 
successful venture for the United States; Washington tried to repeat this feat in South 
Korea with Syngman Rhee; South Vietnam with Ngo Dinh Diem; Iraq with Nouri Al-
Maliki; and Afghanistan with Hamid Karzai. Although the United States took measures 
to ensure that a reliable homegrown leader was selected, arguably the United States rarely 
has had success in installing a leader that represents the true interests of his nation and 
most could not lead his country into a secure future like Adenauer. The United States has 
attempted to repeat the successes of postwar nation building in West Germany and Japan, 
using a model that may be overly formulaic—and that fails to account for the context of 
the time and places at issue.  
The past and its discontents cannot be discounted and should be understood at a 
deeper level than knowing just the historical facts of a country. The Soviets and 
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Americans were successful in their regions of defeated Germany precisely because they 
understood and worked with the historical and political background from which Germany 
was emerging. Historical differences became evident throughout the Cold War as the 
United States stepped further and further from the governance of the FRG, shifting its 
relationship toward that of a partner, whereas the Soviet Union kept the GDR, and its 
leadership, close within its sphere of influence until the very end. If the United States 
wants to move forward in its endeavor to build nations—stable, democratic partner 
nations—rather than the current trend of building states, then due diligence should be 
undertaken to understand the battlefield of nation building.  
In the East German case, on the one hand, there was plenty of coercion to aid the 
Stalinist leaders in their quest to transform the people of the SBZ. The Stasi was a key 
component in this ongoing process within the GDR, and, not surprisingly, a significant 
part of the narrative that historically defines East Germany today. The elements 
combined from the KGB and the Gestapo were unique to this region, which helps explain 
the effectiveness of the agency as an instrument of ideological (or putatively ideological) 
enforcement. To be sure, secret police organizations did not enjoy great success in all 
Eastern Bloc countries, particularly after the post-Stalin course correction, leaving the 
GDR as the crown jewel of Soviet implementation. The Stasi was an effective tool based 
on the historical framework from which it was wrought, and it provided continual 
feedback to its party functionaries. Also, the Stasi was, by dint of its role and function, 
not insulated from the portents of societal change like the SED was and warned of the 
impending political shifts.  
Of course, this kind of social and political surveillance and control befits and 
bespeaks an illiberal regime—which means the Stasi model most likely is not the kind of 
approach that American nation-builders would or should embrace. Minor invasions of 
privacy within the United States present a problematic situation as its democratic 
government comes to grips with how to balance providing security to its citizens from 
non-state actors and how to continually uphold the virtues of individual liberty, one of the 
most fundamental values accorded to the American people.  
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None of this is to say that the armed organs of state have no role in the formation 
of new or reformed nations. Militaries facilitate and propagate a national identity, as has 
been seen in Europe in the modern era; the SED recognized the utility of the “school of 
the nation” in the NVA and used it to the party’s ends, as well. However, the party 
instituted an increased militarization of education amid a growing civil-military divide 
that ultimately united the church and underground peace movements against the SED 
with its implementation of the military education law of 1978.  
In contrast, the military as a locus of national identity in the Federal Republic of 
Germany is entering a new era of how much it will impact society’s national 
consciousness with the suspension of its draft in 2011. An all-volunteer military force is 
the model that the United States has followed since 1973, and the impact of fostering a 
national identity and avoid a growing civil military divide is a question that must be 
continually answered. Like the Federal Republic, and its institution of Innere Führung, 
the United States must keep its civil-military relationship balanced, where the soldier can 
seamlessly come from society and be reintegrated back into society, while representing 
American interests and values abroad. Just as the U.S. and Federal German armed forces 
carefully educate their citizens in uniform in the sometimes difficult balances that 
democratic civil-military relations demand, nations under construction demand militaries 
that are versed in the necessary habits of mind and practice. 
The East German case also demonstrates a fair bit of carrot—or positive 
reinforcement—to go with the stick of social coercion. For example, the SED’s 
understanding of the importance of the intelligentsia, education, and mass organizations 
was the key to holding onto power throughout the GDR’s existence. The restoration of 
these influential structures, in concert with the core functions of society, were essential in 
elevating the legitimacy of the party as their master and communism as their path to 
peace. The overall goal of the party was to manufacture the ideal socialist personality 
using every avenue possible, even elevating the status of the family to state functionary. 
While the GDR was a tightly controlled and ultimately illiberal society, the United States 
can take the totality of the approach as a potential model to move forward. The specific 
centers of gravity that the SED identified within East Germany as the keys to success are 
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not consistent in every nation, nor should they expect to be. However, the understanding 
of a nation’s core functional components, defined through accurate historical analysis, is 
essential in order to reach the people.  
An understanding of the past is necessary for successful nation building, but, as 
the East German case demonstrates, it is not the only factor that matters. The natural 
reaction for a modern government is to evolve and change in the environment it is 
presented. The East Bloc’s leadership did not evolve with the respective populations 
there the way Western democracies did. Whether it was through term limits or the 
process of voting in a new head of state because the old no longer represented national 
interests, democracies have changed—and not always smoothly as in the case of France’s 
Fourth Republic or America’s cultural revolution in the 1960s. In contrast, the leadership 
in the communist bloc was fairly static throughout its existence—the parties clinging to 
their old guard who had been personally present at the moment of communization and 
who thus represented a direct link to the founding ideas and requirements. These regimes 
were inflexible to change—by design, as Mikhail Gorbachev, himself the first Soviet 
leader of the entirely post-revolutionary generation, discovered with some surprise.  
The United States has not fully registered or appreciated the end of the Cold War 
in 1989, distracted as it was with the impending meltdown in Kuwait and the subsequent 
military action of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Had the lessons of the GDR’s genesis, 
coercive power of cohesion, and dissolution been accurately analyzed, some of the 
lessons that have since come to light may have been useful for the United States’ 
subsequent nation building efforts. In the end, Fulbrook asserts that the GDR 
leadership’s, and in many ways the communist bloc’s, “wholesale disregard for certain 
values, this willing destruction of lives, emotions, careers, this preparedness to deform 
both human personalities and the physical environment in pursuit of the alleged higher 
goal of history, are utterly unacceptable.”240 For the United States to avoid this stigma, it 
must correctly assess the historical framework for any system it is imposing, whether it is  
 
                                                 
240 Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship, 287. 
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democracy in a far off land, providing security to its citizens through clandestine security 
apparati, or avoiding a civil-military dislocation. For this, the lessons from the GDR can 
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